CLASSIFICATION TO HALFWAY HOUSES: A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION *

Faced with prison overcrowding, institutions must seek alternatives to imprisonment. An under researched possibility is the use of halfway houses for the placement of offenders serving prison sentences. The LSI, an objective risk classification instrument, was administered to inmates from three jails. Low-scoring inmates from two of the jails were flagged for placement in correctional halfway houses, and the third jail was blind to LSI scores. The halfway house placement rate was 51 % for the jails that used LSI scores and 16% for the jail using traditional subjective classification procedures. The results suggest that subjective offender assessments run the risk of over classifying offenders whereas objective risk assessments yield more appropriate classifications.     

Science Education Policy: A Symposium

This article introduces Science Education Policy: A Symposium. The symposium examines trends and issues from the vantage points of individuals from a variety of backgrounds who are concerned with science education in the US. Although optimistic, most of the contributors to this symposium agree that considerable research and evaluation is still needed before we can make informed policy decisions that would have a lasting impact on science education. The expected outcome of the symposium is to stimulate discussions among educators and policymakers.     

Intergovernmental Structure and Fiscal Management Strategies: A Crossnational Analysis

Does intergovernmental structure have a systematic effect on the impacts of local governments' fiscal policy responses? Using empirical data from more than 800 local governments in five countries, the article concludes that intergovernmental structure is associated with the impact attributed to various fiscal management strategies. Such strategies have generally had greater impact in local governments in federal systems than those in unitary state systems. There are similarities between federal and unitary local governments regarding the fiscal management strategies that have least impact, and both types stress the importance of productivity gains via technology. But the differences in relative importance and level of impact are more striking than the similarities. In particular, fiscal management strategies involving the relations of the local government with other governments, such as obtaining intergovernmental revenue and shifting service provision to other governments, have greater impact in significantly more federal systems than in unitary state systems. These federal local governments also experience greater impacts from increasing user charges and raising local taxes. In contrast, local governments in unitary state systems place greater reliance on the more politically expeditious strategy of across–the–board expenditure reductions and on reductions of capital spending. These findings suggest that local governments in more decentralized systems have greater flexibility to manipulate relations with other governments in order to enhance their own fiscal situation. The data also suggest that the government's level of fiscal stress is not systematically associated with the level of impact from most fiscal management strategies, especially in the unitary state systems.     

Explaining the Decline of Macro-corporatist Political Bargaining Structures in Advanced Capitalist Societies

A growing consensus among many observers of Western European politics has developed in recent years that, in certain countries, national level, consensus-based political bargaining arrangements involving representatives of organized capital, trade unions, and the state are giving way to more sectorally-based, conflictual forms of relations. These developments suggest an overall decline in the efficacy of national-level corporatist institutional structures in the liberal democracies of Western Europe. This article contends that neither of the two general theoretical approaches to the study of corporatism - the liberal model of the "neocorporatist state" (which fails to acknowledge the potential for serious system-threatening instability within corporatism) nor the Marxist model of corporatist "political structures" (which incorrectly predicts labor-generated corporatist instability due to inevitable rank-and-file discontent with the policy outputs of corporatist forms) - can account for this current wave of macro-corporatist instability and decline. In response to this theoretical impasse, this article develops a capitalist-centered explanation for the declining significance of corporatist forms. Business interests, it is maintained, may no longer be viewing corporatist arrangements as beneficial due to certain domestic structural economic changes and to transformations in the global capitalist system.     

The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies

Abstract.  Although much has been discovered concerning the resources and preferences that parties take into the coalition formation game in Western European parliamentary democracies, we know a good deal less about the payoffs they receive. Portfolios constitute an important payoff, not just because they provide access to patronage, but because influence over policy decisions tends to go with control over the key government portfolios. It is easy to discover which and how many portfolios each party holds in any government, but what is missing is accurate measurement of the value or salience of these portfolios. Some attempts have been made to measure portfolio salience, but they have lacked one or more of the following properties: cross-national scope, country-specific measurement, coverage of the full set of postwar portfolios, measurement by multiple experts and measurement at the interval level. In this article, we present a new data contribution: a set of portfolio salience scores that possesses all of these properties for 14 Western European countries derived from an expert survey. We demonstrate the comprehensiveness and reliability of the ratings, and undertake some preliminary analyses that show what the ratings reveal about parliamentary government in Western Europe.     

Candidates' policy platforms and election outcomes: The three faces of policy representation

Abstract.   Recent empirical studies by Alvarez and Nagler, Erikson and Romero, and others conclude that candidates' and parties' policy platforms only modestly affect their electoral support. This suggests that candidates/parties can win elections even when their policies differ sharply from the policy beliefs of the constituencies that elect them. This raises the question: How can voters exercise control over government policies via elections? We report applications to American and French presidential election data that suggest three paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, we find that presidential candidates can moderate their policies with at most a modest change in vote share, but if they move by the same amount to a more extreme position, they face severe vote losses that could cripple their election prospects. Alternatively, movement by both candidates in the same direction or a policy shift by the voters may have a major effect on the outcome.     

Taxpayer Reporting Responses and the Tax Reform Act of 1986

This paper examines the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the reporting decisions of taxpayers, using microlevel information from the 1984 and 1989 Statistics of Income. We find that tax reform clearly mattered in the reporting decisions of individuals, with reporting elasticities that cluster between 0.3 and 0.7. However, our results also indicate that individuals' estimated responses vary in different ways for individuals with different income levels, in ways that differ by the types of incomes received by taxpayers, in ways that are sensitive to the estimation approach, and in ways that depend upon data adjustment methods.     

Ideas and agency in immigration policy: A discursive institutionalist approach

Political science literature tends to depict the role of ideas in policy in two distinct ways: as strategic tools mobilised by agents to achieve pre‐given preferences; or as structures imposing constraints on what is considered legitimate or feasible. Discursive institutionalism seeks to combine these insights, suggesting that while actors are indeed constrained by deeply entrenched ideas, they nonetheless enjoy some autonomy in selecting and combining ideas. This article seeks to further develop this approach in two ways. First, it identifies three discursive strategies through which policy actors can selectively mobilise ideas: they may foreground one level over others; exploit ambivalence in public philosophies; or link programme ideas over time by invoking ‘policy legacies’. Second, the article elucidates the mechanisms through which such strategic selections can in turn modify existing public philosophies and programme ideas, thereby influencing policy change. These claims are examined by comparing discourse on immigration policy liberalisation in Germany and the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2008. Evidence is found of all three discursive strategies. Moreover, the article shows how, in the German case, these discursive representations led to longer‐term adjustments in underlying programme ideas and public philosophies on immigration.