Darker Legacies of Law in Europe. The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and Its Legal Traditions

Eds. Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh. With a Prologue by Michael Stolleis and an Epilogue by Joseph H. H. Weiler. Oxford: Hart. 2003. Pp. 416.     

EUROPEANIZATION IN MANAGING EU AFFAIRS: BETWEEN DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE,A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ESTONIA,HUNGARY AND SLOVENIA

Scholarly research into Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia has shown that the idiosyncrasies of the new EU countries (especially with respect to institutionalizing and centralizing the co‐ordination of core executives in managing EU affairs at home) persist. They are complemented by trends toward convergence (such as growing co‐ordination efforts and a common tendency: that of the prime minister to be the centre of co‐ordination). In this article external Europeanization pressures, national administrative traditions (the legacies of both pre‐communist and communist systems), and the patterns of party competition that cause variations in politico‐administrative relations, are tested as possible explanatory variables of differences seen in the three countries when managing EU affairs. While national administrative traditions play similar roles to those seen in old(er) member states by filtering the EU‘s impacts, the effect of patterns of party competition on politico‐administrative relations when managing EU affairs has been filtered by the accession states’ national priorities of integrating with the EU.     

Expert Policy Analysis and Bureaucratic Politics: Searching for the Causes of the 1987 Stock Market Crash

Shortly after the 1987 stock market crash four government agencies published studies analyzing the causes of the crash. Their analyses and explanations were at odds with each other. This article explores how weak theory, the methodological variations, and problem definition fed the political orientations of the agencies and shaped the agencies' analyses. Basically it shows how sophisticated policy analysis can serve political and bureaucratic ends.     

The Contingent Diffusion of Parliamentary Oversight Institutions in the European Union

What explains the variation in institutional adaptation of national parliaments to European integration? Whereas the existing literature has mainly focused on domestic conditions, this article explains institutional adaptation to integration by focusing on inter‐parliamentary diffusion. The argument draws on ‘learning’ mechanisms of diffusion on the demand side and on ‘emulation’ mechanisms on the supply side. Parliamentary demand for external inspiration is related to uncertainty about functional oversight institutions, and the selection of sources to perceptions of similarity and success. Demand arises in new European Union member parliaments and young democracies that then turn towards culturally alike countries and old democracies. Using spatial econometrics, support is demonstrated for the argument in the article while ruling out alternative diffusion mechanisms such as spatial proximity and learning from Scandinavian frontrunners once links along cultural similarity and democratic experience are controlled for. The results underline the limits of the ‘isolated polity’ approach in the comparative study of institutions in Europe's closely integrated political system, while also showing that, even in this favourable environment, diffusion pathways are contingent on the mechanisms generating demand among policy makers and shaping their selection of sources for external information.