Soviet ideological discourse and Perestroika

Abstract. The role played by Soviet ideology during the perestroika reforms has not been fully analyzed because ideology has not been seen as a structural force influencing Soviet political life. This paper charts the effect that this neglect of ideology has had on some explanations of perestroika and seeks to redress the balance. Various ways of dealing with ideology during perestroika are examined and an alternative approach to Soviet ideology (viewing it as a discourse) is developed. This approach to Soviet ideology shows that it was a vital, but unstable, element of the Communist Party's power. The approach is then applied to the Gorbachev reforms to show how ideology played a crucial part in breaking up the power of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from 1985 onwards.     

Reviewing Directors’ Business Judgements: Views from the Field

Directors take decisions that can have significant impacts on others, as illustrated by the global financial crisis and the collapse of Thomas Cook Group plc. Yet many academics argue that courts should not review or impose liability on directors for poor business judgements. These arguments often rely on untested empirical assumptions about directors’ behaviour and attitudes. Through semi-structured interviews and focus groups, we explored the responses of directors, legal practitioners, company secretaries, and board headhunters to the prospect of judicial review of directors’ business judgements. Our findings challenge orthodox thinking: many directors supported some form of review and the impact of review may not be as great as the literature predicts, nor necessarily detrimental. The debate about whether courts should review directors’ business judgements should therefore move away from reliance on negative empirical assumptions about the impact of review, to clearly articulating, and engaging with, normative positions that underpin opposition to, and support for, review.     

Regulatory Assessment of Investments by Telephone and Electric Utilities*

A utility's investments are included in the rate base if the expenditures can pass the “prudent” or “used and useful” tests. Regulators have a difficult time applying these tests to telephone companies because little is known about the demand for new services. Under current regulatory procedures, telephone companies face an incentive system which rewards the firm for successful entry into new markets, but because of the lack of information about the demand for new services, the cost of failures is absorbed by customers of existing services. We propose a rate-making standard that would insure that existing subscribers of telecommunications services will not subsidize the new services that are being introduced by local exchange telephone companies.     

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND THE EVALUATION OF PARTICIPATORY INSTRUMENTS IN SPANISH CITIES

The article examines the role that personal experience with participatory mechanisms plays in the explanation of the perceived efficacy of these instruments. The first part demonstrates that , contrary to most expectations, citizens who have direct experience with these processes have a more negative evaluation of their performance. Where does this frustration effect come from? The second part analyzes three potential explanations of why this pattern emerges: (1) overly high prior expectations; (2) the existence of an underdeveloped institutional participatory context; and (3) the design of participatory mechanisms. We use a public opinion survey representative of the Spanish adult population living in medium sized cities to test these hypotheses. Results show that participants' overly high expectations are not crucial. On the other hand, people who live in more participatory cities and those who participate in individually based mechanisms do not feel the same disappointment with participatory experiences.     

Political Practices of Care: Needs and Rights*

Abstract. In this paper the authors argue that the exploration of the nature of needs and rights should begin with the actually existing organization of care and of justice in society. The authors raise two key concerns with this organization: 1) the invisibility of care to some, and 2) the inaccessibility of rights to others. Recent work by care scholars has called attention to the ways the current organization of care work perpetuates the myth of self‐sufficiency for some, while reducing others to mere dependents. Law and Society scholars have demonstrated the problems of uneven access to legal remedies within the current organization of the legal system. Addressing these concerns simultaneously reveals both the problems of the current organization of needs and rights as well as illuminating alternative possibilities. The authors argue, first, that a justice perspective, based on rights is inadequate because its presumed universality is belied by the reality of the inaccessibility of rights to many. Second, the authors argue that a care perspective, currently formulated upon the assumption that only some people have needs, is also flawed because its presumed particularity distorts the human experience and subsequent policies. Instead, the authors need to conceive of care in a public way that permits both rights and needs to be understood as applicable to all. The authors propose some initial thoughts about how to create such a public concept of care.     

SUPERVISION REGIMES,RISK, AND OFFICIAL REACTIONS TO PAROLEE DEVIANCE*

Parolee deviance has emerged as a central issue in policy debates about crime and punishment in American society as well as in scholarship on “mass incarceration.” Although the prevailing approach to studying parolees conceives of parole violations as outcomes of individual propensities toward criminal behavior (i.e., criminogenic risk), we consider how indicators of individual risk and characteristics of formal social control systems combine to account for reported parole violations. Using data on California parolees, we examine the effects of parolees’ personal characteristics, their criminal histories, and the social organization of supervision on parole violations. We advance the notion of a “supervision regime”—a legal and organizational structure that shapes the detection and reporting of parolee deviance. Three components of a supervision regime are explored: 1) the intensity of supervision, 2) the capacity of the regime to detect parolee deviance, and 3) the tolerance of parole officials for parolee deviance. We find that personal characteristics and offense histories are predictive of parole violations. However, we also find that introducing supervision factors reduces the effects of offense history variables on violation risk, suggesting that the violation risks of serious, violent, and sexual offenders are partially explainable through the heightened supervision to which they are subject. In addition, we find that supervision intensity and tolerance are generally predictive of violation risk. Capacity effects are present but weak. We conclude with a discussion of how the supervision regimes concept illuminates the gap between macro‐ and micro‐analyses of social control.