Determinants of regime type in newly independent states

Abstract.  Since 1945, newly independent states have differed from longer lived states in their greater risk of violent conflict and more challenging environment for democratisation. The authors of this article theorise that certain economic, demographic, violence-related and external factors should affect the regime type (level of democracy versus autocracy) in newly independent states. Examining exclusively newly independent states that have undergone major political transitions allows one to determine factors favouring democracy over autocracy under such volatile circumstances. The authors test several hypotheses, using cross-sectional and cross-sectional time-series analyses, and find that economic development elevates the level of democracy in new states. Cultural heterogeneity has no effect, but external factors play an important role. Genocide and politicide reduce democracy, while civil wars have the opposite effect. These findings prove robust to alternative measurements of the dependent variable and alternative model specifications.     

ASSESSING MESSNER AND ROSENFELD'S INSTITUTIONAL ANOMIE THEORY: A PARTIAL TEST*

In Crime and the American Dream, Messner and Rosenfeld contend that culturally and structurally produced pressures to secure monetary rewards, coupled with weak controls from noneconomic social institutions, promote high levels of instrumental crime. Empirically, they suggest that the effects of economic conditions on profit-related crime depend on the strength of noneconomic institutions. This investigation evaluates this proposition with cross-sectional data for U.S. states. In brief; the nonlinear models show considerable, indirect support for Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie theory, revealing that the effects of poverty on property crime depend on levels of structural indicators of the capacity of noneconomic institutions to ameliorate the criminogenic impact of economic deprivation. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF DRINKING AND DRIVING: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION,SOCIAL NORMS,AND MORAL COMMITMENTS*

A structural model based upon data from a random sample of 1,000 U.S. drivers accounted for 56% of the variation in alcohol-impaired driving, with total monthly alcohol consumption as the strongest predictor. Significant contributions of age, sex, peer group values, and preference for beer suggested the operation of socialization to group norms. There was a substantial contribution of personal moral commitment against drinking and driving. However, there was no significant inhibitory influence of legal knowledge and perceived arrest risk. These findings are consistent with Andenaes's view that general deterrence should be more broadly construed to include the moral component as well as the fear component of the law     

POLICE DISRESPECT TOWARD THE PUBLIC: AN ENCOUNTER‐BASED ANALYSIS*

We use observations of police encounters with 3,130 suspects in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg to estimate three influences on police disrespect: how suspects behave, their personal characteristics, and the location of the encounter. Logistic regression models show that suspects' behaviors were the most powerful predictors, but the suspect's sex, age, income, and degree of neighborhood disadvantage were also significant. Minority suspects experienced disrespect less often than whites (statistically significant in the hierarchical analysis controlling for degree of neighborhood disadvantage). These effects are concentrated in St. Petersburg, where the chief had made the suppression of police abuses a visible priority. The findings offer partial confirmation of Donald Black's theory of law.     

THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

A missing piece in the literature that links crime and unemployment is an understanding of the proximate causes of joblessness in the lives of individuals. Granovetter has demonstrated with his concept of social embeddedness that early employment contacts can enhance the prospects of getting a job and subsequent occupational mobility. The alternative implication is that youths who are embedded in criminal contexts can become isolated from the likelihood of legitimate adult employment. This has important implications for an understanding of crime and unemployment, for while much of past macro-level research confirms that unemployment leads to crime in the aggregate, the reverse is likely true at the individual level among adolescents and young adults, especially in community settings with serious crime and unemployment problems. The implications of criminal embeddedness are explored in a well-known set of London panel data. Understanding the process of embeddedness is important because it helps to identify points of intervention, such as peer and justice system contacts.     

How to Make Congress Popular

Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that Congress is unpopular because it does not measure up to the people's populist expectations. Instead of being the “citizen's legislature” that the people desire, it is an institutionalized legislature with well‐paid, longtime members and an elaborate infrastructure of committees, caucuses, parties, and perquisites. The people, it is alleged, desire more of a voice in the decisions made by Congress, they want congressional procedures to be more open so ordinary people know what is going on in the halls of power, and they want more accountability and more representation of the interests of real people. In this paper, I argue that the enactment of this populist reform agenda would actually make Congress substantially less popular with the people. In other words, I contend that the more Congress gives people voice, accountability, representation, and open, visible procedures, the more the people will be dissatisfied with Congress. The real cause of congressional unpopularity is not that people would rather make decisions themselves but that people do not trust members of Congress to make decisions in a non‐self‐interested fashion.