Regulatory Styles,Motivational Postures and Nursing Home Compliance*

Using Kagan and Scholz (1984) typology of regulatory noncompliance, this study examined the perceptions of regulators and of regulatees toward the regulatory encounter to predict subsequent compliance with nursing home quality of care standards. Appraisals of both regulators and regulatees were not driven by motivational analyses of each other's actions, but rather by assessments of performance and social group identity. The regulators saw nursing homes in terms of one evaluative dimension ranging from responsible and not in need of intervention through to irresponsible and needing intervention. The corresponding reactions of nursing home managers involved seeing the regulators as cooperative and sympathetic through to police-like and coercive. On both sides of the regulatory encounter, criticism and reactions to criticism swamped nuanced analyses of motivational underpinnings and rational decision models in explaining compliance. The motivational complexity underlying the Kagan and Scholz typology was, however, apparent in the self-reported motivational postures of managers toward the regulatory process. The postures of managerial accommodation and capture to the regulatory culture were associated with compliance. Over time, resisters to the new regulatory regime became more compliant, particularly those whom inspectors judged as best left alone to adjust. In contrast were managers whose response to the regulatory process was disengagement. Their organizations experienced deterioration in compliance. The study fails to find that certain kinds of regulatory strategies such as deterrence, education and persuasion work better than others across the sample or with specific groups. Extant models focus excessively on how to play the regulatory game without recognizing the potential for players dropping out of the game. Understanding reasons for disengagement and processes for reengagement are fundamental to the application of behavioral decision theory models to the regulatory context.     

DENSITY, DELINQUENCY, AND DESIGN Formal and Informal Control and the Built Environment

This study reviews the literature concerning the general impact of the physical environment on social disorganization, crime, and juvenile delinquency, with a specific focus on the relationship between household density, building density-design, and juvenile delinquency. Two perspectives on control are shown to have developed in an environmental context. One emphasizes the capacity of the built environment to impair informal social control, and the other focuses on the attraction of the same environments for agents of formal social control (the police). A path model is presented. showing that building density-design is an independent predictor of marijuana use and supporting the view that the physical environment can affect informal control. The model also shows that building density-design is a significant predictor of police presence. thus giving empirical support to the notion that the physical environment can affect formal control.     

LIFE‐COURSE DESISTERS? TRAJECTORIES OF CRIME AMONG DELINQUENT BOYS FOLLOWED TO AGE 70*

Linking recently collected data to form what is arguably the longest longitudinal study of crime to date, this paper examines trajectories of offending over the life course of delinquent boys followed from ages 7 to 70. We assess whether there is a distinct offender group whose rates of crime remain stable with increasing age, and whether individual differences, childhood characteristics, and family background can foretell long‐term trajectories of offending. On both counts, our results come back negative. Crime declines with age sooner or later for all offender groups, whether identified prospectively according to a multitude of childhood and adolescent risk factors, or retrospectively based on latent‐class models of trajectories. We conclude that desistance processes are at work even among active offenders and predicted life‐course persisters, and that childhood prognoses account poorly for long‐term trajectories of offending.     

HOW POLICY NETWORKS CAN DAMAGE DEMOCRATIC HEALTH: A CASE STUDY IN THE GOVERNMENT OF GOVERNANCE

This article examines a detailed case study of implementation networks in England using the example of the relocation of the Norfolk and Norwich hospital, which became a flagship PFI project for the Labour government after 1997. The case study illustrates the workings of the new order of multi‐layered governance with both local and national networks from different policy areas interacting. However, it also sheds light on the governance debate and illustrates how in the world of new public management, powerful actors, or policy entrepreneurs, with their own agenda, still have the facility, by exercising power and authority, to shape and determine the policy outputs through implementation networks. It is argued that, whereas policy networks are normally portrayed as enriching and promoting pluralist democratic processes, implementation networks in multi‐layered government can also undermine democratic accountability. Four aspects here are pertinent: (1) the degree of central government power; (2) local elite domination; (3) the fragmentation of responsibility; and (4) the dynamics of decision making which facilitates the work of policy entrepreneurs. All these factors illustrate the importance of ‘the government of governance’ in the British state.     

A Comparison of US and UK Asbestos Liability

This article compares the impact of asbestos liabilities in the U.S. with that in the U.K. The maximum exposure to asbestos in the U.S. occurred during the time period from the 1930s to the 1960s. In the U.K., the peak asbestos exposure likely occurred during the 1960s and the 1970s. Asbestos-related deaths are projected to have peaked before 1997 in the U.S. Asbestos-related deaths in the U.K. are projected to peak sometime before 2020—some 20 years after those in the U.S. In the U.S., asbestos-related claims are believed to have peaked around 2002. Given the anticipated peak in asbestos-related disease deaths in the U.K., the peak in asbestos-related claims in the U.K. will likely occur sometime after 2020. There are differences in judicial systems and victim compensation schemes (private and public) between the U.S. andthe U.K. However, trends in recent U.K. court decisions and regulatory activities (as well as increases in victim awareness, litigation, on-going discovery, victim support groups, and claim compensation) suggest that the U.K.'s current asbestos liability situation may be analogous to what the U.S. experienced in the mid-1980s, and that the impact on the U.K. courts and economy may be far from over.     

Inside the Black Box: How do OSHA Inspections Lead to Reductions in Workplace Injuries?*

We examine different models of employers’ responses to OSHA inspections. The “detection/correction” model assumes that responses are limited to correcting the violations that inspectors cite. The “behavioral shock” model assumes that firms respond by paying more attention to safety issues, even those unrelated to OSHA standards. We test whether some injury types are more affected by inspections than others, or by citations of particular OSHA standards. We conclude that, although citing particular standards can reduce injury types specifically related to those hazards, inspections also affect a wider range of injuries, suggesting a broader impact on managerial attention to safety.