The Limits of the Economic Analysis of Regulation: An Empirical Case and a Case for Empiricism*

Can the tools of the economic analysis of law be used to identify the optimal level of stringency in regulatory standards? Data on the costs of nursing home regulatory compliance suggest that in this domain such models could only produce wildly false estimates of the optimal level of stringency. Among the reasons for this are that: (a) actual costs of compliance explain only 19 percent of the variance in the subjectively expected costs that should inform rational choices; and (b) while there is a powerful effect of expected cost on compliance disaggregated by standard, this is not a monotonic increasing effect but a parabolic relationship. The reason for the finding that almost half the nursing homes lie on the wrong side of the turning point of this parabola is that these homes tend to be run by managers who are “disengagers” from the regulatory culture. Their behavior is not to be understood in terms of rational game playing but in terms of dropping out of the regulatory game. The disengagers are in the regulatory system but not of it and certainly not economically calculative about it.     

Trauma Interventions and Systems Change in Rural Areas: The Role of the Juvenile Court Judge in Collaboration with Mental Health Professionals

This article will focus on the evolution of the collaborative work of the Louisiana Rural Trauma Services Center (LRTSC), a Center within the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, and the 23rd Judicial District, a jurisdiction in south Louisiana serving three rural parishes. We will describe how the collaboration and joint efforts, and the changes that have been made in terms of availability of evaluation and treatment resources, seem to be influencing both the educational and judicial systems in St. James Parish and potential sustainability of some of the identified resources. The article will examine how the court and the LRTSC work together with emphasis on the evaluation, reporting and recommendation processes, outcomes and benefits to date, and challenges for the future.     

State‐Level Institutional Effects on Legislative Coalition Unity in Brazil

How do subnational factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together? We estimate the effects of two institutional forces operating at the state level—intralist electoral competition and alliance with governors—on voting unity among coalition cohorts to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. Larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, are less unified than smaller cohorts. We find no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, a result suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape governors' influence relative to that of national‐level legislative actors.