Pharmaceutical regulation in Denmark and the UK: Reformulating interest representation to the transnational level

Abstract. Common elements are recognised across Denmark and the UK in regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, which are attributed to the impact of associational action at the sector level. Our examination of arrangements for regulating medicine prices and information displays many of the hallmarks of neo-corporatism – namely negotiation with state agencies, compliance seeking among members, and policy implementation through acting as a Private Interest Government. During a period of economic internationalisation and directive international agencies, we show how business interests have reformulated to transnational levels, with associations, despite facing a greater complexity of interests to represent, having a strong impact upon regulatory outcomes. These have been neither wholly deregulatory or reregulatory, but partly reflect events at national levels. This may predict regulatory developments at the European level in other sectors.     

Multimember Districts' Effect on Collaboration between U.S. State Legislators

In this article, I demonstrate that multimember districts form a basis for collaboration between two legislators. In order to maximize the limited incumbency advantages they possess, legislators from multimember districts form coalitions in an effort to generate greater credit‐claiming opportunities and policy benefits for their district. In order to test this conception, I utilize a natural experiment and an opportunity to observe institutional change in North Carolina's elimination of multimember districts during the 2000–2002 redistricting cycle. Coupled with cross‐sectional analysis of several states that use both single‐member and multimember districts, empirical evidence strongly corroborates my conception of multimember districts as a basis for collaboration between representatives.     

Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors

When legislators and governors clash over the size of American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins? Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state budget negotiations that follows the “staring match” logic captured by divide‐the‐dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical support for our predictions.     

MANAGERIAL STRATEGIES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The organizational arrangements of local authorities are known to vary. Explanations of the variation observed have usually been set within the contingency theory perspective. The present paper utilizes a different approach, examining how far structural variations are a consequence of differences in strategic style. The concept of strategic style is discussed and applied to data from English local authorities. Results indicate that strategic style does influence local authority structural arrangements.     

THE INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local government is the subject of official review. This paper suggests that any review of the system of local government should consider at the outset the purposes or values which provide the rationale for local government, and should examine how the institutional framework and prevailing organizational practices promote or hinder achievement of those values. The values of local government as traditionally understood are summarized and aspects of the institutional framework and organizational practices are explored.