Policy dynamics and the evolution of state charter school laws

Baumgartner and Jones (1993) showed how radically new policies emerge on government agendas as a consequence of exogenous shocks to policy subsystems displacing privileged interests. But how do these policies evolve post-punctuation? In this paper, we present three different models of policy change. Policies may revert to the old status quo if displaced interests re-assert themselves, or they may be “locked-in” by new interests now reaping the benefits. Alternatively, they may incrementally change as lawmakers “learn” how to better meet target population needs, particularly by witnessing how other jurisdictions address similar problems. We test these models with data on change in state charter schools laws over time. We find that whether old status quos are overthrow, and the fate of charter policies when they are enacted, is influenced more by competing political interests, especially interest groups, than elite and public perceptions of broad systemic crises. Yet, we also find that changing demands on the state and learning from the successes and failures of neighboring states also play significant roles.     

Signaling virtue: voluntary accountability programs among nonprofit organizations

This article examines the structure of nonprofit voluntary accountability and standard-setting programs, arguing that these programs can be understood as collective action institutions designed to address information asymmetries between nonprofits and their stakeholders. Club theory and the economics of certification suggest that such programs have the potential to provide a signal of quality by setting high standards and fees and rigorously verifying compliance. Such mechanisms can signal quality because higher participation costs may allow only high-quality organizations to join. The article examines the implications of signaling theory using an original dataset on the structure of 32 nonprofit accountability programs across the globe. While many programs set high standards for compliance, the key distinction between strong and weak programs is the use of disclosure or verification mechanisms to enforce compliance. Contrary to theoretical expectations, compliance standards and verification do not appear to be substitutes in creating stronger voluntary programs.

Regionalisierung und Dezentralisierung in Mittel- und Südosteuropa 1997–2007

The review essay takes stock of the last decade of decentralisation and regionalisation research in Central and South Eastern Europe. Classifying the existing scholarship with regard to its focus of analysis, its explanatory programme, and methodological predilections, we suggest to distinguish three different agendas: system transformation, EU conditionality and subnational governance. We argue that scholarly interest in regionalisation and decentralisation issues from the perspective of state transformation or Europeanisation is vanishing. Instead, we witness the emergence of a subnational governance approach which is rooted in comparative politics and policy analysis. The debate about decentralisation and regionalisation in CEEC is thus in a process of “normalising” and converging with the Western European subnational political discourse.     

Public-Private Partnerships als Gegenstand der (Politik-)Wissenschaft

The article reviews the state of research on public-private partnerships (PPP) which, following a development in the Anglo-Saxon countries, in the past few years have been introduced as a policy tool in Germany as well. Based on a short conceptual and historical introduction, recent political science publications as well as contributions from economic, legal, and administrative scientists are systematized and critically assessed. This also includes a review of selected publications on PPP experiences in Britain. Finally, the paper discusses relatively neglected research issues, including methodological deficits as well as problems of input legitimacy.     

Political pressure deflection

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.     

Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate

A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal‐agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his or her own ends. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi‐experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is not associated with similar changes in the U.S. House of Representatives—as expected, since the amendment did not change House electoral institutions.