China’s economic reforms: A synoptic view

Structural-systemic reforms of China’s economy were initiated in 1979 against a background of economic crisis, absence of a reform blueprint, and unsatisfactory experience with past developmental models. The reforms may be seen as having five major components; pragmatic gradualism; marketization of the coordination mechanism; diversification of the property structure (destatization); outward orientation (controlled openness); and retention of political monopoly power by the communist party. Of these, the proliferation of various property forms is novel, problematical, and conceptually intriguing. The reforms have resulted in or been accompanied thus far by modernizing but erratic and uneven economic growth and marginal political liberalization; strong inflationary pressures; unresolved state sector property problems; and uncertainties of political succession. The vision of China’s economic future is obscured by the unfinished business of significant state ownership of industry and an authoritarian polity seasoned by corruption. Unless these are removed, the danger remains that the reforms will be undone.     

Lobbying and asymmetric information

Informational lobbying — the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies — is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or conceal its private information. It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobbying can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry information in the ‘right direction’. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the message as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. qu]Much of the pressure placed upon government and its agencies takes the form of freely provided “objective” studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment of particular policies (Bartlett, 1973: 133, his quotation marks). qu]The analysis here is vague. What is needed is an equilibrium model in which lobbying activities have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to building such a model that would explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with decision makers, and so on) and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful. (Tirole, 1989: Ch. 1.3, p. 77, Rentseeking behavior).     

GSR2005—Continuity of the ENFSI Proficiency Test on Identification of GSR by SEM/EDX

Abstract:  Within the framework of the ENFSI Expert Working Group "Firearms" a proficiency test on the detection and identification of GSR by energy-dispersive scanning electron microanalysis (SEM/EDX) is carried out in a 2 years term. The latest test was performed in 2005/2006 and was denoted as GSR2005 . Seventy-five laboratories from 28 countries participated in this proficiency test and submitted in total 83 independent data-sets. The participating laboratories were requested to determine the total number of PbSbBa containing particles on a synthetic test sample following their own laboratory specific methods of automated GSR particle search and detection by SEM/EDX. Furthermore size and position of the detected particles had to be reported by the laboratories and were evaluated statistically. The results were compiled by means of z -scores according to the IUPAC and EURACHEM guidelines—assessing individual laboratory achievements (inter-laboratory) as well as intra-laboratory performance—and were compared to the results of the previous proficiency test run GSR2003 ( 1 ). The comparison shows that there is a noticeable improvement in the method's detection capability.     

Opposition research: some theories and practice

Abstract. An institution unique to parliamentary systems of government oper-ates within the Canadian House of Commons: a set of research offices serving each of the major opposition party caucuses but financed by public funds under the government's control, The writer, who was the organizing director of the largest of these 'counter-bureaucracies, examines the origins of the institution, delineates the competing role definitions considered for adoption, recounts operating difficulties, and tries to analyse some of the traceable conse- quences for the conduct of parliamentary business and party affairs. While the Research Office makes a discernible impact in a number of secondary dimen- sions, the characteristics of the members of the opposition and of their leader are found to be the major determinants of their parliamentary performance. Sommaire. Une institution qui est unique parmi les systèmes parlementaires de gouvernement fonctionne au sein de la chambre des communes. Il s'agit de bureaux de recherche au service des principaux partis en opposition, mais financés par les fonds publics sous le contrôle du gouvernement. L'auteur qui était directeur-organisateur de la plus grande de ces « bureaucraties parallèes » examine les origines de cette institution, expose les définitions du rôle compétitif considérées pour adoption, explique les difficdtés pratiques et essaie d'analyser quelques-unes des conséquences certaines sur la conduite des affaires parlementaires et de celles des partis. Bien que le bureau de recherche ait une influence indéniable sur un certain nombre de décisions secondaires, c'est le caractère particulier des membres de l'opposition et de leurs chefs qui est I'élément détenninant de leur comportement parlementaire.     

The Enduring Scandinavian Party System

The frozen party hypothesis has been rejected in several contemporary studies. However, by conceptualizing the Scandinavian parties in three categories, and by focusing the study on the three pole parties originally emphasized by Stein Rokkan, the bulk of the Scandinavian party system is still frozen. Diminishing class voting and electoral instability are inefficient measures of how well cleavages structures are reflected in the party system. Cleavages must be understood in a broader context where the struggle between the three fronts to incorporate new categories of voters is the very essence of an enduring cleavage structure.     

Whatever happened to regionalization? The curious case of Nova Scotia

Abstract: The case of Nova Scotia well illustrates the complexities involved in implementing a strategy of regionalization in health care. In 1996, under the leadership of Liberal Premier John Savage, thirty‐six local hospital boards were amalgamated into four regional health boards. By 2001, however, Conservative Premier John Hamm had expanded the four regions into nine district health authorities. Both measures were justified by explicit references to cost containment and greater accountability, even though the first took numerous units and amalgamated them, while the second took the few units and multiplied them. How can this seeming contradiction be explained, and what does it say about the nature of regionalization as a policy tool for health care? The authors find that neither cost containment nor citizen engagement can explain the system of regionalization which currently informs the health care system in Nova Scotia. Rather, the present form of regionalization exists because it is useful politically in two ways: it maintains the centralization of power that existed previous to the formal decentralization of health care; and it restores the system of representation that existed prior to the implementation of regionalization. The authors conclude that, to understand how regionalization has been implemented in any given jurisdiction, one must pay close attention to the political context in which strategies of regionalization have been executed. Sommaire: Le cas de la Nouvelle‐Écosse illustre bien les complexités inhérentes à la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie de régionalisation dans les soins de santé. En 1996, sous le leadership du Premier ministre libéral John Savage, 36 conseils d'hôpitaux locaux ont fusionné pour former quatre conseils de sante régionaux. En 2001, cependant, le Premier ministre conservateur John Hamm a élargi les quatre régions pour les transformer en neuf conseils de santé de district. Ces deux mesures ont été justifiées par des références explicites à la compression des coûts et à une plus grande imputabilité, même si la première a consistéà prendre de nombreuses unités et à les fusionner, tandis que la seconde a consistéà prendre quelques rares unités et à les multiplier. Comment peut‐on expliquer cette apparente contradiction, et qu'est‐ce que cela nous dit sur la nature de la régionalisation en tant qu'outil de politique en matière de soins de santé? Les auteurs trouvent que ni la compression des coûts, ni la participation des citoyens ne peuvent expliquer le système de régionalisation qui caractérise actuellement le système de soins de santé en Nouvelle‐Écosse. Au contraire, la forme actuelle de régionalisation existe parce qu'elle est politiquement utile de deux manières: elle maintient la centralisation du pouvoir qui existait avant la décentralisation officielle des soins de santé; et elle restaure, jusqu'à un certain point, le système de représentation qui existait avant la mise en œuvre de la régionalisation. Les auteurs concluent que, pour comprendre la manière dont la régionalisation a été mise en œuvre, il faut prêter une grande attention au contexte politique dans lequel ces stratégies de régionalisation ont étéélaborées.     

Finland

European Journal of Political Research -