Strange bedfellows: Dynamics of government‐business relations between Chinese local authorities and Taiwanese investors

China poses a theoretical challenge in that corruption and rent‐seeking activities have not hindered foreign direct investment and economic development. Studies in development have documented the problems of rent‐seeking. International capital presumably hesitates to step into a Third‐World country such as China, which cannot protect private property rights with a comprehensive legal framework. However, for the last decade in China export promotion, foreign capital, and industrial development have proceeded simultaneously. This research argues that local officials helped investors overcome the problem of high transaction costs during a period of institutional uncertainty and local informal rules supplied foreigners with effective protection of property rights under corrupt circumstances. By controlling rent‐seeking activities, local officials created a wide variety of ad hoc patronage for private and foreign investments within their administrative domain. In return, local governments received extrabudgetary payments for the official patronage. This article provides an in‐depth case study of the so‐called joint venture between Taiwanese enterprises and Chinese local authorities in the Pearl River Delta, the institutional bases for their collaboration and the dynamics of the relationship under institutional change.     

Democratization without decentralization: Local government in Hong Kong

The literature on democratization tends to neglect the question of decentralization. The case of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China shows that there can be partial democratization without decentralization. Democratization in Hong Kong took place in the mid‐1980s and 1990s, when more directly elected seats were introduced to political institutions at the territorial, municipal and district levels. However, democratization has not been accompanied by an attempt to decentralize administrative and political power to the institutions at the local level. These political institutions, including the Urban Council (UrbCo), Regional Council (RegCo) and District Boards remain relatively weak vis‐à‐vis the executive branch of the government. The recent attempt by the HKSAR government to abolish the UrbCo and RegCo represents a move toward centralization of administrative and political power. Moreover, District Boards remain consultative and politically powerless. It is the dynamic relationship between democratization and decentralization at which future research should be directed.     

Ego development in adolescence: Longitudinal studies

Adolescents from four schools (one inner-city, two suburban, and one private) were tested two or three times using the Washington University Sentence Completion Test of Ego Development. Testing intervals ranged from 1.5 to 6 years. About half (N=193) the original pool was retested at twelfth grade. Every sample showed a mean rise in ego level; for six of eight samples that rise was statistically significant. Every pair of testings showed a postive correlation between scores; 10 of 14 correlations were significantly different from zero. Thus both test-retest correlations (about 0.5) and change scores support the hypothesized sequence of ego development. Significant correlation between ego level and intelligence occurred in two schools (0.6 at elementary and junior high grades and 0.4 at twelfth grade), but correlation was about zero in the private school.These studies were supported by Grant MH-05115 and Research Scientist Award MH-00657, both from the National Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service.Received her Ph.D. from Washington University. Main interest is adolescent development.Received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Main interest is theory and measurement of ego development.