International Law as Language—Towards a “Neo” New Haven School

This paper examines the tension between the mainstream belief in international law as a source of objectivity distinct from politics and its new stream critics that question the validity of such a distinction. It is argued that, as a type of language, international law is not distinct from politics as a function of objectivity, but rather by the fact that it serves the international community’s thymos. The phenomena of global administrative law and NATO’s use of force in Kosovo are analyzed as examples of how the thymos drives international law. Building on feminist theories of international law, the article sets forth a vision of international law as the primary communicative device for the international community’s thymos.     

Who Cares? Explaining Perceptions of Compassion in Candidates for Office

Although prior research establishes the important effect perceptions of compassion have on vote choice, no systematic research examines why some candidates are perceived as more caring than others. In an era where television and social media put candidates’ personalities front and center, the lack of research on this topic is problematic. In this article, I explain why voters view some candidates as more caring than others. I argue that voters view politicians as compassionate when there is a commonality to link them. A commonality demonstrates an empathetic connection, or the ability to understand another’s feelings. This, in turn, convinces voters that the politician is sympathetic, or willing to do something to help. Without an empathetic connection, claims of sympathy by politicians will be viewed with greater levels of skepticism. I generate a classification system for the sources of commonality that link voters with politicians, including shared experiences, shared emotions, and shared identities. Using three survey experiments, I show how candidates can build empathic bonds with voters and better their chances of election.

     

Democratising the separation of powers in EU government: The case for presidentialism

The EU, while not a state, can be conceived as a mixed or compound political system. Capturing its character of separation of powers has implications for understanding what the EU polity is, but also should be, not least from a democratic standpoint. Hence, the article addresses the EU as system of government in order to identify one appropriate path of democratisation. It first revisits separation of powers and the typology of parliamentary and presidential government to delineate criteria for categorising horizontal (i.e. between branches) division‐of‐powers arrangements. To this end, it elaborates in particular the criteria proposed by Steffani which allow for a more parsimonious differentiation between types of governments. Subsequently, the EU polity (e.g. its structure and functioning of separation of powers and “checks and balances”) is assessed regarding its conformity to a government type. Finally, I discuss implications for identifying a more certain point of reference for an approach to democratise EU government that is not only institutionally compatible, but also ‘demos enabling’.