Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions

The original studies of "competitive authoritarianism" and "hegemonic authoritarianism" inspected the occurrence of hybrid regimes during the 1990s but stopped short of testing their propensity for democratic change. This article assesses the causal effects of hybrid regimes, and the post–cold war period itself, on regime breakdown and democratization. Using a dataset of 158 regimes from 1975 to 2004, and a discrete measure for transitions to electoral democracy, I find that competitive authoritarian regimes are not especially prone to losing power but are significantly more likely to be followed by electoral democracy: vigorous electoral contestation does not independently subvert authoritarianism, yet it bodes well for democratic prospects once incumbents are overthrown.     

Democracy@internet.asia? The challenges to the emancipatory potential of the net: Lessons from China and Malaysia

It is a commonly held view that, given the unique characteristics of the internet, it provides real opportunities for democratisation and political transformation, especially in societies where freedom of speech and expression is constrained by government controls. This article challenges this assumption by examining the impact of the internet in Asia with specific reference to China and Malaysia. In particular the article argues that to understand the impact of the internet on developing economies it is essential to examine the political economy of the internet-locally, regionally and globally. While the net may provide a new medium for dissent and opposition, its impact is offset by two principal factors. First, the existence of a marked digital divide between North and South (as well as the discrepancies that exist within specific countries in terms of gender, education and wealth) and second, by growing commercialisation.     

Revolutionary conflict in federations: the Indian case

Federations promise to provide autonomous, representative governance that is flexible enough to overcome potential internal conflict resulting from the dual stresses of governing diverse populations and power overreach. India is the world's biggest federation but also hosts the most violent revolution in modern history against a federal state. Since 2004, 150,000 people have been killed or displaced in the war between the Communist Party of India-Maoist and India's government. Conflict management efforts led not to resolution but catastrophe across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand as state responses contradicted each other and the centre's efforts. The differences illustrated how institutional mechanisms of decentralisation create, sustain and otherwise alter internal revolutionary conflicts that cross subunit boundaries. Three unique characteristics come into play when federal governments tackle revolutionary conflict: picking from subunit actions like policy buffets, exacerbation of state–subunit fissures and empowerment of local elites who put political self-interest above conflict resolution.     

The election timing advantage: Empirical fact or fiction?

Do non-fixed election dates in Westminster parliamentary democracies create an unfair incumbent advantage? The consensus in the literature is that the incumbent party can gain an advantage at the ballot box by controlling election timing (Bakvis, 2001; Docherty, 2010; Smith, 2004; White, 2005; Wolinetz, 2005). Surprisingly, however, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this claim. We address this lacuna by providing an empirical test of whether the election-timing power matters for incumbent vote support. We do so by employing an innovative web-based voting experiment. Our findings show that the government does gain an advantage by timing an election when it is to their advantage, but the context is limited to conditions where the election follows immediately after a heightened level of positive government coverage.