The risks and benefits of searching for incidental findings in MRI research scans.

We weigh the presumed benefits of routinely searching all research scans for incidental findings (IFs) against its substantial risks, including false-positive and false-negative findings, and the possibility of triggering unnecessary, costly evaluations and perhaps harmful treatments. We argue that routinely searching for IFs may not maximize benefits and minimize risks to participants.     

Land lotteries,long-term wealth,and political selection

Public Choice - Does personal wealth cause individuals to select into public office? This study exploits the 1805 and 1807 Georgia land lotteries to investigate the hypothesis that wealth increases...     

Correction to: Traditional Versus Internet Media in a Restricted Information Environment: How Trust in the Medium Matters

Political Behavior - The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake. The gender dummy variable was mistakenly coded in reverse order. The interpretation treated it as (0 =...     

The Ocean of Yoga: An Unpublished Compendium Called the Yogārṇava

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The Yogār?ava (‘the ocean of yoga’) is a Sanskrit compendium on yoga that has not been published, translated or even mentioned in secondary...     

Reducing Crime Through Environmental Design: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment of Street Lighting in New York City

Journal of Quantitative Criminology - This paper offers novel experimental evidence that violent crimes can be successfully reduced by changing the situational environment that potential victims...     

Visions of (In)Security and American Strategic Style

This essay was stimulated (provoked) by discussions in three separate venues: (1) a U.S. Naval War College conference on "Alternative Futures in War and Conflict: Implications for U.S. National Security," held in late 1999; (2) several recent widely circulated "blue-ribbon" reports on the subject; and (3) recent papers emerging from the U.S. defense bureaucracy speculating on strategic visions of the next ten to twenty years. My contention is that the prevailing official and quasi-official debate exhibits excessive and overly definitive emphases on: (1) particular facets of insecurity; (2) attributions to the U.S. of benign intent and capacity; and (3) assumptions that most others share that interpretation of our words and deeds. There also tends to be unwarranted neglect of representation and standing issues which discriminate for and against different policy perspectives and forms of program expertise. A plea is offered for an alternative approach based on what we know about how persons, organizations, and communities can best position themselves for (in)security futures.