The effect of predatory rent-seeking on household saving and portfolio choices: A cross section analysis

The existence of predatory behavior, when measured by the number of lawyers per capita and the crime rate, seems to have an impact on saving and investment behavior in U.S. households. Where the risk of redistribution are lowest, the incentives to save are higher and, a fortiriori, the willingness to invest in highly vulnerable financial instruments is enhanced. Either because of low saving rates or because of disintermediation, households in states where the risks of redistribution are greater avoid accumulating financial assets.Recent years have seen a considerable decline in the U.S. saving rate. There is also evidence of large differences in saving rates from one country to another, with U.S. households among the lowest savers. Yet not all of these variations have been explained satisfactorily in empirical studies based on conventional theory. Perhaps one explanation which has been inadequately studied is the reduced expected retirement time horizon whether it be due to objective conditions such as retirement age and life expectancy or to uncertainty. Some reasons for myopic planning horizons are macroeconomic instability (McCauley and Zimer, 1989), the possibility of nuclear war (Slemrod, 1982, 1986 and 1989); Henderschott and Peek, 1985 and 1987); and the fear of socio-political conflict (Stewart and Venieris, 1985). I have suggested and tested here yet another factor: the fear of future redistribution. Using differences in interest income across U.S. states, this paper shows that fear of redistribution does seem to have a large influence on saving behavior.     

SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE OR NATIONAL BUSINESS‐AS‐USUAL? THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS IN THE NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK

The partnership principle in EU cohesion policy was introduced in order to involve subnational authorities and interest organizations in policy formulation and implementation. In this article we examine how the member states have reacted to this call for a new way of making public policy. We argue that the multi‐level governance literature and the critics of the multi‐level governance framework have not examined implementation structures properly, but have focused on regional influence. We conduct a comparative analysis of the Dutch and Danish implementations of the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. Our findings show that when examining implementation structures it becomes clear that member states are in full control of the re‐allocation of EU funds. They show that Denmark and The Netherlands have been able to absorb EU cohesion policy within already existing national implementation structures of labour market policies and regional development. One central theoretical implication of our study is that the focus of studies of any fundamental re‐allocation of power resources in cohesion studies should comprise the entire network of implementation rather than the strategies of its individual component actors.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.