Alistair Rieu‐Clarke  Flavia Rocha Loures 《Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law》2009,18(2):185-197

On 21 May 1997, at the UN General Assembly, an overwhelming majority of States voted for the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non‐Navigational Uses of International Watercourses – a global overarching framework governing the rights and duties of States sharing freshwater systems. To date, the Convention counts 17 Contracting States – 18 short of the number required for entry into force. This article examines whether and why States should support the Convention towards ensuring its entry into force. We first look at the governance of international watercourses in order to illustrate the relevance of the Convention. The article also examines the Convention's drafting and negotiation process, the subsequent practice of States, some possible reasons slowing down ratifications and the likelihood of entry into force in the foreseeable future. Noting the widespread State support for the Convention in 1997, we conclude that, while various reasons have possibly prevented that support from translating into entry into force, the need for an effective UN Watercourses Convention has not diminished. In view of current human and environmental threats to the world's water resources, coupled with the poor governance of transboundary watersheds, the potential role that the Convention could play, once in force and widely ratified, as discussed, may in fact be more critical than ever.  相似文献   

    

REBECCA ADLER‐NISSEN 《Journal of common market studies》2008,46(3):663-684

How are controversial national opt‐outs managed and perceived in the EU? This article argues that the United Kingdom and Denmark compensate diplomatically for the exclusionary effects of their exemptions. A Bourdieudian approach to national diplomacy in the EU is developed to explore how British and Danish officials handle their opt‐outs. By drawing on extensive interview data, it is demonstrated that the two opt‐out champions employ various sophisticated strategies to overcome the dilemma between autonomy and influence. Some diplomatic strategies reduce marginalization while others enhance it. National opt‐outs are ambiguous attempts at avoiding further European integration.  相似文献   

    

Delphine Marie‐Vivien 《The Journal of World Intellectual Property》2008,11(4):321-344

Geographical indications (GIs) deal with local issues. Their protection generates an original scheme of governance. GIs were first protected in France and they were later harmonised in the European Union (EU) and then included in the TRIPS Agreement, which was the basis for the enactment of the GI Act in India and GI protection in Pakistan. The Basmati rice example will illustrate the different objectives of GI protection in these two countries and in Europe. Europe is an emerging market for Basmati, and therefore the EU is setting rules of importation based on its tradition of food quality. Such an increase in exports of Basmati raises the issue of a protection that is efficient in the international market, but still is adapted to Indian and Pakistani needs. On the one hand, Basmati has been defined for a long time as the name of plant varieties which now includes evolved varieties. On the other hand, Basmati is still not yet registered as a GI, because the concept of GI is a very recent development in India and Pakistan. The Basmati case raises general issues for GIs protection worldwide: tradition versus modernity, product definition versus method of production and geographical environment.  相似文献   

    

Paul L. Posner 《Public administration review》2009,69(2):233-244

The unraveling of the budget process described by Irene Rubin will have extraordinary consequences for the long-term budget outlook facing the nation. The retirement of the baby boom generation will prompt unprecedented and unsustainable structural fiscal imbalances for decades to come. Early policy action on the spending and revenue sides of the budget is critical to avert fiscal and economic crisis and to phase in changes in order to avoid precipitous and politically perilous actions in the future. Yet such actions constitute what amounts to a politically unnatural act, as one generation of political leaders is asked to make sacrifices in current policies benefiting future generations. Budget process reforms can serve to highlight the salience of these issues and help deal with the significant political hurdles faced by decision makers in making these intertemporal budgeting trade-offs. Ironically, the need for budget rules and processes has intensified as policy makers have become more vulnerable to polarized political parties, ever more watchful media, and mobilized interest groups. Budget rules and processes can help policy makers cope by protecting their ability to make the hard choices that will be necessary. The pressures for budget process reform will accelerate as the current financial crisis increases near-term budgetary pressures, promoting greater alignment between near-term and long-term fiscal problems.  相似文献   

    

Paul Peretz  Jean Reith Schroedel 《Public administration review》2009,69(4):603-612

History is institutional memory writ large. One looks at economic history to see what problems recur, what causes them to recur, what solutions have worked best in the past, and which interventions have made the problems worse. The authors argue that a moderately complex interaction between the workings of the financial sector, the way in which the political system is organized, and the administration of regulation makes perfect regulation of the financial sector extremely unlikely. Many of these problems arise as a result of conflicting incentives for those participating in and regulating the financial field. The authors find that some proposed solutions have improved matters but have costs, and that some proposed solutions have actually worsened problems in the financial sector.

Peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.
— Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1837

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Timothy Ka‐Ying Wong  Po‐San Wan 《公共行政管理与发展》2009,29(5):441-451

Based on data from two opinion surveys conducted in 2000 and 2008, this study shows that Hong Kong people have been consistently highly aware of the seriousness of different environmental problems and relatively pessimistic about the future resolution of these problems. Such pessimism is arguably related to their lack of confidence in the government's enforcement of environmental protection. Through an analysis of the environmental policy‐making and enforcement agency and three selected enforcement cases, the study further finds that the people's lack of confidence can be traced to the government's failure to bring about a comprehensive, integrated, far‐sighted environmental strategy with sophisticated institutional support and detailed enforcement mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

    

Michael Taylor  Paul Plummer  John R. Bryson  Steve Garlick 《Politics & Policy》2008,36(2):216-231

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Victor Lapuente  Remo Fernndez‐Carro 《Politics & Policy》2008,36(6):1006-1043

Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her fairly? In the science–government relationship, an incumbent may be better off if he or she does not provide—or does not provide a fair pay to public scientists. We propose a simple game‐theoretic model for understanding the trust problem in the relationship between governments and scientists. The model shows how with reliable governments (democracies), bureaucratic contracts (e.g., secure tenure) are not optimal since they have low‐powered incentives (in contrast to the high‐powered private‐sector type of contracts) and run against scientists' responsiveness to government demands. However, with nonreliable governments (dictatorships), bureaucratic contracts are second‐best solutions because they protect scientists against the possibility of governments' misbehavior (i.e., ex post opportunistic defections, such as canceling research programs overnight). An empirical analysis confirms the predictions: bureaucratic contracts enhance scientific productivity with nonreliable governments (dictatorships) but hamper scientific productivity with reliable governments (democracies).  相似文献   

    

Paul Talcott 《Asian Politics & Policy》2009,1(2):343-345

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Duncan Matthews  Viviana Munoz‐Tellez 《The Journal of World Intellectual Property》2006,9(6):629-653

Article 67 of the Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights places an obligation on developed country World Trade Organization (WTO) members to provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least‐developed WTO members. This article provides an analysis of technical assistance provided by the United States, Japan and the European Communities (EC) and its member states in accordance with article 67. The article suggests that least‐developed countries can learn lessons from a comparative analysis of the technical assistance that the United States, Japan and the EC have so far provided to developing country WTO members.  相似文献