Rent seekers who demand government production: Bureaucratic output and the price of complements

Many goods and services produced by government bureaus are sold at prices which do not maximize net revenues (maximize profits or minimize losses). Indeed, bureaucratic institutions typically create incentives to expand production beyond that which would maximize net revenues. Furthermore, many of the products sold by government bureaus are highly complementary to privately produced goods and services. If a bureau's output is not priced to maximize net revenues, then private sellers of various complements may be in a position to extract rents by adjusting their prices. This paper explores the implications of bureaucratically generated rents for privately produced complements. First, rent seeking can materialize when private sector interests apply pressure for expanded bureau production and lower bureau prices. Second, if the bureau does expand its production capacity beyond the net revenue maximizing level, and if a private producer obtains exclusive rights to supply complements, then the extraction of rents will result in an inefficient mix of resources in bureaucratic production. The basis of the inefficiency is not the reason often given, however. Rather, inefficiencies arise because the actual level of use is less than that which the ‘bureaucratic plant’ was constructed to produce due to the relatively high price of the complementary services.     

VICTORIA

The first half of 1979 saw a continued effort by government to rationalize departmental responsibilities and policies. In the field of human services the government established the Health Commission and the Community Welfare Services Department (discussed in more detail in the two previous Chronicles) and has responded to one of the major contemporary social issues by establishing a Victorian Employment Committee.     

Examining the Canadian Government's Resistance to Including Socioeconomic Concerns in Genetically Modified Seeds Regulation: A Policy Transfer and Multilevel Approach

In 2011, Canadian Members of Parliament refused to transfer a regulatory initiative taken from Argentina that would have required an analysis of potential harm to export markets before authorizing the sale of any new genetically modified seed. This was the purpose of Bill C‐474, which was defeated in the House of Commons. After exploring Argentina's regulatory framework as a source of transfer, this paper combines a multilevel analysis with a typology of policy transfer mechanisms in order to address the complexities underlying this unsuccessful attempt. We explore how the mechanisms of competition and coercion might have impeded the transfer of such an initiative at the international and the macro‐state levels. Moreover, while a policy transfer network in support of the bill called on previous experiences with genetically modified seeds, their efforts appear to have been outweighed by another network using arguments based on the mechanisms of competition, coercion, and mimicry.     

On Developing an Inter-Agency Trust Scale for Assessing Governance Networks in the Public Sector

ABSTRACT

This article presents the development and validation of a psychometric scale for assessing public sector inter-agency trust. The instrument is grounded in contemporary trust theory and methodologically adapted from a measure developed for private sector alliances. Tested using four discrete studies of governance networks, each addressing transboundary environmental issues such as climate change and fisheries, the scale exhibits reasonably valid psychometric properties while also enabling visualized analysis of networked trust distributions. Based on this work, we outline further research needs with a view to stimulating greater trust research in governance networks and facilitating more collaborative and innovative policy outcomes in the public sector.     

Approaches to the study of China

Abstract

West Papua—or Irian Jaya, as it has been renamed by the Indonesian government—is Indonesia's 26th province, occupying the western half of the island of New Guinea. For the people of West Papua, however, Indonesia is an occupying power. Since the area is so little known, most non-Papuans are unaware that West Papuans have been struggling for independence there ever since the mid-1960s, led by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM—Free Papua Movement).