Competition in political and economic markets

Prepared as a response to Frey and Eichenberger's Anomalies in Political Economy. We thank Gordon Tullock for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the Taylor Experimental Laboratory at Washington University.     

Elections and government spending

It is widely believed that electoral pressures cause legislators to favor government spending programs. This electoral theory of spending is shown to encompass two core hypotheses: (1) the electoral consequences hypothesis, which states that support for spending programs improves the representative's electoral showing; and (2) the legislator insecurity hypothesis, which states that greater electoral insecurity leads representatives to be more in favor of spending programs. A test of these ideas using spending scores for U.S. representatives in 1986 finds that neither hypothesis is supported by the data.     

Last rights. In sickness and in health, more people are taking life's biggest decision away from doctors and into their own hands

When dying is all that awaits them, more and more people are choosing certain death now rather than uncertain life on medical support systems. But the decision seldom comes easy, as a Newsweek reporter discovers during three weeks with the doctors, nurses, patients and families in an intensive-care ward. A best-selling guide to suicide fires debate over when it is right to let life go--and who should make that choice when the patient no longer can.