Crafts and trades (english): Comment on T. Shanin

Eric Hobsbawm's outline of the concept of social banditry suggest certain conditions of existence for that mode of primitive rebellion. Primary among these conditions are the presence of a ‘traditional peasant environment and the absence of ‘industrial capitalism’. This paper presents a critique of Hobsbawm's specifications, and suggest two alternative conditions: the presence of class conflict which unites direct producers, and the absence of effective, institutionalised political organisation of producers’ interests. This reformulation is illustrated by reference to the Kelly Outbreak in late nineteenth century Australia.     

Universal Citizenship Through the Discourse and Policy of Rafael Correa

This article investigates political opportunities and constraints associated with incorporating the concept of universal citizenship into migration debates. Analyzing the speeches of Ecuador's president Rafael Correa over eight years, the article argues that Correa strategically crafted a narrative of universal citizenship to undergird politically beneficial policies. Political constraints from constituents and rivals, and the populist nature of his governing style, hollowed out progressive migration policy innovations to the point that universal citizenship became a rhetorical device more than a substantive policy agenda. Through this empirical case, the article develops a more nuanced critical understanding of universal citizenship discourses as sites for negotiating the relationship between states and migrants.     

Legislative Transparency and Credit Risk

Open governance requirements are designed to improve accountability, which implies that transparent governments are more trustworthy stewards of their publicly invested power. However, transparency may also reduce institutional effectiveness and inhibit political compromise, diminishing the capacity to manage resources responsibly. We assess empirical support for these competing perspectives in the context of American state legislatures, many of which have become exempt from state sunshine laws in recent decades. We leverage variation in the timing of these legislative exemptions to identify the effect of removing transparency in a crucial governing institution on investors’ risk perceptions of states’ general obligation bonds. Our analysis of these data during the period 1995–2010 suggests that removing legislative transparency reduces state credit risk. We conclude that while openness in government may be normatively desirable, shielding legislative proceedings from public view may actually be better for states’ debt repayment capacity, improving their overall fiscal health.