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Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis
Elise Giuliano 《后苏联事务》2018,34(2-3):158-178
AbstractDonetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples’ Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues. 相似文献
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Jocelyn M. Boryczka 《New Political Science》2017,39(1):36-57
“Grab them by the pussy,” Donald Trump declared on a hot microphone in 2005. This statement went viral late in the 2016 United States (US) presidential campaign, indicating how the colonized vagina still shapes the anatomy of contemporary sexism. This article develops an intersectional genealogy of sexism at its point of emergence in early radical feminist writings of the 1960s and 1970s read through Franz Fanon’s influential work at the time on colonization and decolonization. This reading locates essentialism and universalism as two interconnected limits on sexism’s analytic purchase within a colonialist discourse used to identify women’s global oppression while simultaneously deploying it in ways that excluded Black and Third World women. A dualistic logic of colonization constituted by the three operations of internalization, totalization, and ossification arises from this analysis to reveal a colonialist logic woven into sexism’s conceptual fabric through the colonized vagina. Sexism retains colonial residues that resurface in contemporary feminist activism and discourse as illustrated by Western feminist organizing which uncritically equates the Designer Vagina industry with female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) in African and Middle Eastern countries, a move that erases differences and hinders building cross-cultural coalitions much less a transnational feminist movement. Decolonizing the colonized vagina, occupied by a range of forces except the women in whom it resides, I argue, is critical to loosening the universalist and essentialist bonds on sexism enough to reclaim the vagina as home for women to advance their belonging as fully embodied heterogeneous subjects in various communities. Contemporary feminists, I conclude, should claim their “right to return,” in this case to the vagina as home and place of belonging on the fluid borderlands between the hymen and uterus, as a step toward ending sexism. 相似文献
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Christopher Salvatore Matthew L. Hiller Benta Samuelson Jaime S. Henderson Elise White 《Juvenile & family court journal》2011,62(4):19-36
The shift of the juvenile justice system from its initial rehabilitative ideal toward a more punitive orientation highlights the need to systematically document key elements of the juvenile drug court model. In particular, it is important to clearly document the role of the juvenile court judge because he or she is considered vital to this program model. The current study used participant observation as well as confidential questionnaires on which youth shared their perceptions of the judge. Findings show the judge‐participant interactions typically were brief, varied by the participants' level of compliance with the program, and that sanctions were given twice as often as rewards. Youth perceived the judge to be fair, respectful, and concerned about their lives. Discussion focuses on the significant opportunity that juvenile drug court judges have for positively influencing the lives of drug‐involved youth. 相似文献
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Michael J. Williams Jocelyn J. Bélanger John Horgan William P. Evans 《Terrorism and Political Violence》2013,25(6):1327-1341
ABSTRACTUtilizing a sample drawn to represent the general U.S. population, the present study experimentally tested whether a call-center’s disclaimer regarding limits to caller confidentiality (i.e., that operators would be required to refer calls to law enforcement if callers were to discuss anyone who was a danger to themselves or others) affected disclosures related to a third party’s involvement with terrorist groups, gangs, or such party’s commission of assault and/or non-violent crimes.Disclaimer type did not significantly affect the number of terrorism-related disclosures. Furthermore, it did not significantly affect either the number of gang-related disclosures or reports of assault. However, the law enforcement referral disclaimer/condition reduced the number of disclosures of non-violent crimes that were not directly related to terrorism, gangs, or assault, though its effect accounted for less than one percent of the variance between conditions. Additionally, disclaimer type did not significantly affect willingness to recommend the call-center, nor did that effect vary significantly by age or sex. Implications for the call-center’s role in addressing ideologically motivated violence (terrorism, violent extremism), as a form of secondary/targeted prevention, are discussed. 相似文献