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Wakefield J 《Journal of health law》2004,37(3):493-502
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Martin H. Krieger 《Journal of policy analysis and management》1986,5(4):779-797
“Big” decisions are defined as discontinuous, abrupt, and unique, in contrast to “little” decisions, which are marginal, commensurable, and additive. We can model big decisions, as well as a wider range of little decisions, if we enlarge our notion of decisionmaking to include legal interpretation, rites-of-passage ritual and conversion experience, heroic leadership, critical judgment of works of literature and art, and entrepreneurship. These models are exemplary of a more encompassing “culture of decisionmaking,” involving six practices: marginalism, untouchableness, gaps, action, judgment, and entrepreneurship. Although big decisions may often be reduced to sets of little decisions, when a decision is treated as big it becomes a powerful mode of initiation, commitment, and justification of a project. 相似文献
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Joel M. Ostrow 《Communist and Post》1996,29(4):413-433
This article develops a comparative institutional framework for evaluating the new legislatures of the former Soviet Union, and demonstrates that the conventional wisdom about the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is wrong. It was not a totalitarian, Soviet institution whose omnipotent and malevolent Chair singlehandedly dominated policy outputs and controlled the membership. Rather, the Supreme Soviet's non-partisan, committee-centered design enabled the committees to dominate the legislative process and to virtually exclude conflict, even on such objectively contentious legislative issues as the annual budget. However, the non-partisan design denied the legislature the mechanisms for controlling the Chair on non-legislative, political issues, particularly in relations with the executive branch. On legislative issues, the Supreme Soviet was a well-oiled machine, but on political issues it was out of control, thus leading to the legislature's demise. This article demonstrates the utility of an institutional framework for comparing post-communist legislatures, and the necessity of disaggregating legislative and political issues when evaluating legislative performance. 相似文献