Anticorruption agencies: expressive,constructivist and strategic uses

This article explores the reasons for the introduction of anticorruption agencies of a specific type in Eastern Europe. It is argued that one of the important functions of these agencies—which are stronger on information gathering, coordination and strategy rather than on investigation of concrete cases—is to give to the government some leverage over the anticorruption discourse. Presenting the anticorruption commissions and agencies as (discourse-controlling) instruments gives an answer to the troubling question why governing parties are at all interested in the introduction of such bodies. Apart from instrumentalization in political discourse, anticorruption bodies in Eastern Europe have had other effects as well. As shown in the Baltic case, institutional engineering provides for a brief window of opportunity during which political forces committed to integrity could gain the upper hand. The problem in Eastern Europe, however, is not the lack of such windows of opportunities—it is more the lack of really committed political forces capable of continuous and consistent anticorruption effort.     

GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS

In recent years, legislators in all fifty states have given grandparents rights to petition for visitation privileges with grandchildren that can be enforced over parental objections. Grandparent visitation rights reflect an effort to protect meaningful relationships children enjoy with nonparental caregivers, enlist the assistance of extended family when the child's nuclear family is disrupted, and defend the interests of grandparents themselves. This psycholegal analysis explores the direct and indirect consequences of grandparent visitation statutes for family functioning. Statutory provisions are summarized, and the effects of these statutes are evaluated in light of what is known about the role of grandparents in child development, how courts evaluate children's "best interests" in grandparent visitation disputes, and how these statutes can alter family functioning in informal ways. The authors conclude that there are risks as well as benefits to children and families in grandparent visitation statutes, and suggest directions for procedural and statutory reform.     

Irrelevance of the soft budget constraint for the shortage phenomenon

Kornai's thesis that shortage results from demand expansions bred by the soft budget constraint, derives from his implicit assumption that price regimes of input and output firms are different. Since any firm is both an input and an output firm, which discards the assumption as logically untenable, excess demand can only turn up because of lower than contracted inputs of labor and management that are not offset by an adequate downward adjustment of earnings. Expansions of demand that appear to be autonomous, are incited by uncertain deliveries of inputs, that is, by inefficiency (of output firms) as well. A by far the largest part of excess demand can be explained by state preferences for fast growth. As planners are more successful in generating investment, and the ensuing consumer, demand than in expanding production, shortage is inevitable regardless of the character of the firms' budget constraints.