Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition

Under plausible circumstances, a monopolist in one market canuse its control of prices in that market to force competingdownstream buyers to sign tying contracts that will lever itsmonopoly into another market. Specifically, the monopolist ofthe tying good can place each downstream buyer in a prisoner'sdilemma by offering them more favorable pricing on the tyinggood if they sign a requirements-tying contract covering thetied good. Since a buyer benefits on receiving more favorablepricing on the tying good and the competitors do not, and suffersif the competitors receive more favorable pricing on the tyinggood and the buyer does not, buyers will sign the tying contracteven when they would earn higher profits if they all refusedto sign. This enables a monopolist in one market to inefficientlyexclude an entrant in another market.     

Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and Economics Perspective

This article examines the various approaches legislators may use to compensate victims of catastrophes. Traditional law and economics of insurance literature, with respect to government relief and insurance solutions towards financial compensation, is used to analyze (highly diverging) approaches in Europe and the United States. First, the importance of liability (insurance) is discussed in cases where a liable injurer can be identified; second, the possibilities of first-party insurance are examined, whereby various regulatory solutions (particularly the French model of providing mandatory coverage for catastrophes) is critically discussed. The (first-party) insurance solution is compared with public intervention, and a distinction is made between ad hoc government relief on an ex-post basis and structural compensation funds. The solutions applied and discussed in many countries are critically analyzed for their ability to provide adequate compensation at low costs and their effects on incentives for prevention and for developing private (insurance) solutions.     

Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 4th Edn * Adrian Briggs and Peter Rees, Eds

This fourth edition, three years after the previous edition,overall is approximately 100 pages longer. The cause of thisgrowth is not hard to find; the blame is fairly laid at thedoor of the EU where its Conventions have been revised and re-revisedtime and time again and now the Regulation of the EU's Councilwhich has resulted in a variety of new absurdities having tobe placed on top of the national jurisdictional rules internalto the United Kingdom (and, presumably, to those of each otherMember States of the EU). This was the state of affairs at thetime of the third edition, leading the authors to state in theirintroductory chapter that litigators live, in the language ofthe Chinese curse, in interesting times. It is now three years later and in the fourth edition we haveanother layer     

The legal aspects of corporate computer forensic investigations

The use of computer forensics was previously limited mainly to law enforcement agencies. However, UK organisations are increasingly undertaking computer forensics activities for incidents such as fraud, money laundering, accessing or distributing indecent images, harassment, industrial spying and identity theft amongst others. In this paper we examine the legal aspects of UK corporate computer forensic investigations.     

Oh, Court of Equity!

Oh! Court of Equity, misnamed, where doubt Leads many in; whencefew or none, get out;

These woeful opening lines of a poem‘Court of Chancery’ by a Reginald James Blewittin 1827, was the way he took up the tomahawk, as he termed itin his preface, against a dire national enemy. In practice,in Lincoln's Inn, he found the great delay and ruinous expensesof a Chancery suit had become proverbial. After giving up practicehe found the tranquillity of the park at Fontainebleau moreconducive to overcoming his previous anguished existence withhis verse satirizing the tedium of proceedings, its expenseand the follies and conceits of former colleagues. Former colleaguesare named in