Decentralization and local public finance in Tunisia

The Tunisian government has long admitted that its excessively centralized administrative and political systems have generated heavy costs in terms of inefficiency and citizen alienation. A major decentralizing reform effort was launched in the mid-1970s, the most important parts of which dealt with changes in local taxation powers, and in the sources and size of grants and loans which Tunisian communes receive from national sources. The result to date has been a modest increase in communal revenues from the new or increased taxes, and a more significant increase in central government grants to local governments. Smaller and more rural communes are heavily dependent on grants to undertake development actions, their tax base being negligible. The revised systefn generates more revenue, and distributes resources more equitably, than the previous arrangements. In theory, it gives a greatly increased latitude to elected communal councils. Nonetheless, the local governments-and the communes in particular-remain severely constrained by central government authorities. The conclusion is that the decentralization reform has been partial and halting, and will in all probability continue in the same manner.     

The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

The influence of institutions on budgetary behavior at the federal level is the subject of this article, which examines the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. While its impact on budgetary priorities and growth seems modest at best, the Act has had a substantial impact on the process of budgetary decisionmaking, the nature of budgetary debate, and the budgetary strategies employed within Congress. These new and generally dysfunctional forms of congessional budgetary behavior are consequences of a budgetary reform that attempted to transfer many of the resource allocation procedures of the Executive branch to a legislative context. The transfer of many Executive branch budgetary procedures has led to the appearance within Congress of budgetary behavior previously confined largely to the Executive branch. The article also discusses attempts to render the congressional budget process more compatible with the legislative environment, analyzing the modifications in the original budget process that have been effected and proposed in recent years.Earlier versions of this article were delivered at the Workshop on Budgetary Control in the Public Sector, Brussels, Belgium, October 13–14, 1983, the meetings of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, October, 1983, and the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September, 1983. Allen Schick, Robert X. Browning, Alex Hicks, Robert Strauss, John R. Hibbings, Evelyn Brodkin, and Rod Kiewiet provided helpful comments, and Pamela Reyner provided secretarial assistance. All remaining deficiencies are the responsibilities of the authors.     

STATE REGULATORY REFORM AND FEDERAL REGULATION

In the current political climate, it seems likely that a "New Regulatory Federalism" will push for deregulation at the federal level, with more regulatory responsibilities for the states. During the 1930s, economic regulatory responsibilities were assumed by the federal government. Protective regulation moved to the federal level in the 1960s. Dissatisfaction with centralized regulation has led to attempts at regulatory reform and decentralization. It is expected that these reforms will lead to greater flexibility, and responsiveness to regional differences.