Local Authorities and Non–elected Agencies: Strategic Responses and Organizational Networks

This article deals with developing relationships between local authorities and local non–elected public service agencies in England and Wales. It classifies local authority responses to the growth of the non–elected state. Account is taken of varying agency characteristics and the constraints and dilemmas they face. From the local authority vantage point what is at stake is organizational (re)positioning in a changing institutional environment. Insights derived from strategic management are therefore utilized. But resource dependencies and exchanges also manifest themselves in these emerging relationships. Moreover, account must be taken of the scope for local authorities to be 'network managers' given the structural reconfiguration of the local state. The analysis therefore takes on board organizational networking theoretical frameworks. Although central government remains best placed to manipulate the 'rules of the [new and uncertain] game', interesting possibilities present themselves if local authorities can show more strategic skill than in the recent past.     

FITTING THE FORUM TO THE FAMILY FUSS

This article analyzes advantages and disadvantages of mediation, collaborative law, and cooperative law based on the parties' capabilities, attitudes about professional services, and assessments of and preferences about the risks of various procedures. Each of these procedures has virtues and there is great value in providing clients and practitioners with a choice of procedures. Under collaborative and cooperative law, lawyers and clients agree to focus exclusively on negotiation from the outset the case, typically using a problem-solving process. Collaborative law involves a written "disqualification agreement" between all the parties and their lawyers under which lawyers are disqualified from representing parties in litigation if either party chooses to litigate. Cooperative law is similar but does not use the disqualification agreement. Because most communities do not have lawyers offering cooperative law, collaborative law groups should encourage at least some of their members to offer clients the option of cooperative law.     

Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief

Hurricane Katrina revealed massive governmental failure at the local, state and federal levels. This commentary brings the modern theory of property rights and public choice reasoning to bear in explaining why officials failed to strengthen New Orleans's levee system despite forewarning of its weaknesses, failed to pre-deploy adequate emergency supplies as the storm approached landfall and failed to respond promptly afterwards. Its main lesson is that no one should have expected government to be any more effective when confronted with natural disaster than it is in more mundane circumstances.     

The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations * 4th edn, By Robert Pearce and John Stevens

The most difficult textbook to write is one on trusts and equitableobligations. The principal market for such a book must be undergraduateswho are forced to combine the study of the law of trusts withperhaps three other legal topics in one year's study. Such isthe nature of the law of trusts and equity     

Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows

Back‐channel negotiations (BCNs) are officially sanctioned negotiations conducted in secret between the parties to a dispute. These extraordinary negotiations operate in parallel with, or replace, acknowledged front channels of negotiation. Back channels are like the black markets of negotiation; they are separate tables where bargaining takes place in the shadows. When front‐channel negotiations fail, they are sometimes eclipsed by successful BCNs even though the same principals, conflicts, and sociopolitical contexts are involved. This article asks: Why do decision makers deploy back channels? What is the impact of BCN on international peace processes? The Palestinian–Israeli peace process, in which both back and front channels have been used consistently, provides the basis for comparing channels and offering initial answers to these questions. The author concludes that while BCN can facilitate breakthrough agreements, it can also damage a peace process by helping to reinforce some of the uncertainties that gave rise to the use of back channels in the first place.     

The Trap

A professor is brought before a secret tribunalin his law faculty for the purpose of decidingthe appropriateness of a student's grade. Thegrounds of the grade appeal are that theprofessor had taught critically instead ofpractically and that he had done so with anacademic bias and prejudice. He is also allegedto have taught philosophy rather than law. After many hours of examination andcross-examination as a defendant and as anexpert witness, the professor, Flink, begins adialogue with a spirit in an effort tounderstand the nature and identity of law. Flink comes to appreciate that law is adisplacing discourse rather than a structure ofcategories signified in an official writing. The analytic method familiar to officials incommon law jurisdictions, Flink comes tounderstand, excludes the experiential meaningsthat are manifested through unwritten gesturesand rituals. Officials embody signs withexperiential expectations and past assumptions.The embodiment of meaning brings life intolegal language. But such an embodiment isforgotten as officials decompose textualfragments and reported social events intoanalytic units. Legal analysis is so successfulthat officials even forget that they hadforgotten something so important as theembodiment of meaning.The professor and the spirit also ask whetherjustice is an `ought' and where one can locatesuch an `ought'. They conclude that there is astructure within which legal officials reason.The exteriority of the structure is anunwritten `ought' realm. But the structurepossesses a gap, which enters into such anunanalysable object-less realm. Analyticreasoning has assumed that reason can take anofficial only so far until she or he mustjourney outside the structure to anunanalysable realm of personal values. However, the embodiment of meanings alsoincorporates unwritten collective values ofwhich officials, precisely because of thesuccess of the analysis project in forgettingthat something was forgotten, have never beenconscious. It is such an unanalysable realmthat grounds or authorises the analyticproject. The exterior authorising origin of theanalytic units of the structure rests upon apossibility that requires faith on the part ofthe officials, a faith that there exists afoundation, radically different from theanalytic units, on the other side of thestructure. The officials can, at best, imagineor picture the authorising origin, located asit is in the unanalysable object-less realmexterior to the written language of thestructure. The imagined origin takes the `form'of a bodiless spirit. The officials (and theprofessor and spirit) are haunted by thepossibility that the structure of humanlyposited rules are ultimately authorised by aspirit.