Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data

We study rare events data, binary dependent variables with dozensto thousands of times fewer ones (events, such as wars, vetoes,cases of political activism, or epidemiological infections)than zeros ("nonevents"). In many literatures, these variableshave proven difficult to explain and predict, a problem thatseems to have at least two sources. First, popular statisticalprocedures, such as logistic regression, can sharply underestimatethe probability of rare events. We recommend corrections thatoutperform existing methods and change the estimates of absoluteand relative risks by as much as some estimated effects reportedin the literature. Second, commonly used data collection strategiesare grossly inefficient for rare events data. The fear of collectingdata with too few events has led to data collections with hugenumbers of observations but relatively few, and poorly measured,explanatory variables, such as in international conflict datawith more than a quarter-million dyads, only a few of whichare at war. As it turns out, more efficient sampling designsexist for making valid inferences, such as sampling all availableevents (e.g., wars) and a tiny fraction of nonevents (peace).This enables scholars to save as much as 99% of their (nonfixed)data collection costs or to collect much more meaningful explanatoryvariables. We provide methods that link these two results, enablingboth types of corrections to work simultaneously, and softwarethat implements the methods developed.     

Holding Back the Tide— a Review of Recent Developments in Copyright Law in the United Kingdom

This article surveys recent developments in UK copyright law. It sets these developments in the context of broader trends in copyright law and policy. Significant decisions concerning subsistence of copyright, authorship, infringement, defences, remedies and collective licensing are analysed. The author notes that copyright, and other intellectual property rights, have been given extra force as a result of recent legislative developments. He argues that, against this background, it is possible to discern increasing judicial concern to ensure that such an expansion in monopoly power does not operate against the public interest.     

A cure for the Blues: resolving nonprofit Blue Cross conversions

This Article analyzes the issues involved in converting nonprofit Blue Cross organizations to for-profit status. These issues have arisen in the context of litigation regarding the "reorganization" of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri ("BCBSMo"). BCBSMo had reorganized by creating and transferring a majority of its business to a new for-profit subsidiary. Missouri consumer groups and state regulators characterized the "reorganization" as a conversion requiring BCBSMo to transfer its assets to a foundation dedicated to charitable health purposes. BCBSMo, however, denied that it had any obligation to leave behind its assets in the nonprofit sector. The BCBSMo litigation raises issues common to most conversions of nonprofit healthcare organizations, particularly conversions of nonprofit Blue Cross plans. This Article provides a road map for state regulators and the public to follow in ensuring that the public interest is fully protected in such conversions.     

The Fate of an Orphan: The Hawley Board and the Debates over the Postwar Organization of Medical Intelligence

The US Army's medical intelligence program developed during World War II to meet the requirements for information on the medical threat facing soldiers deployed in the first truly global military conflict. The war served as a proving ground for the application of medical intelligence on a strategic, operational and tactical level. However, hasty postwar demobilization decimated many wartime intelligence programs, including medical intelligence. The US intelligence community recognized the utility of medical intelligence as part of the overall strategic scientific and technical intelligence program and sought ways to rebuild the program. During the post-World War II debates over the unification of the military services and the responsibilities of the nascent CIA, the ‘Hawley Board’ was one of several committees which studied the problems facing the medical intelligence program. Although there was broad consensus on the need for better coordination of medical intelligence, the intelligence community ultimately failed to adopt the recommendations of the Hawley Board. The principal reasons behind the failure of the Hawley plan were the re-emergence of prewar interservice rivalries, the dominant role of the Army medical intelligence program, and the lack of a joint military–CIA vision of a centralized medical intelligence service.