Double Your Trouble: Dual Arrest in Family Violence

When arrest is mandated for domestic violence crimes the arrest of two individuals, or dual arrest, often occurs. This study examines the characteristics of the crime and the people caught in dual arrests, with a special emphasis on the women arrested. The data were drawn from a population of 4138 disposed family violence cases in the criminal court, 448 of their arrest records, and 90 prosecutor files. Thirty three percent of the 448 cases disposed were dual arrests. Persons subject to dual arrest were primarily white, young, nonurban, unmarried employed persons. The incident was likely to involve alcohol or drug use and physical beating with hands or fists. Forty percent of the women arrested were previously victimized in a domestic violence incident. Findings suggest that dual arrests may reflect both the differential use of violence in domestic relations and the over enforcement of policy by some police departments.     

Discounting procedures for environmental (and other) projects: A comment on Kolb and Scheraga

We compare two alternative methods to discount the costs and benefits of environmental projects. These are (1) the shadow price of capital, which can be practically expressed by using the cost of capital and thus the discount rate on government bonds, and (2) the two-stage discounting procedure advocated by Kolb and Scheraga. We suggest that the two-stage approach is in many cases inconsistent with the shadow price of capital approach and will therefore lead to misallocations of resources. We further argue that the use of the cost of capital as the discount rate will be easier than the two-stage procedure, will yield results that are consistent with the shadow price of capital approach, and will be justified by the potential Pareto criterion. Finally, use of the shadow price of capital approach has a potential for achieving considerable consensus in practice as well as in theory, a result that could considerably enhance project evaluation.     

Codification of Administrative Law: The US and the Union

Abstract: The US Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 was engendered by partisan political conflicts. Initially judicial review of administrative rule-making under the act was extremely deferent. In the course of the 1960s and 1970s the federal courts, basing themselves upon the unchanged language of the statute, created a new body of administrative law characterised by very great demands on the agencies and very intrusive judicial review. This transformation was fuelled by partisan realignments, fear of technocracy and desire for greater transparency and popular participation in government decision-making. Because these same forces are now active in relation to the Union, it may be anticipated that similar tendencies toward a demanding procedural law of rule-making and high levels of judicial review will be felt as Union administrative law develops.