The committee assignment process as an optimal contracting problem

This paper adapts a simple model from the optimal contracting literature to explain the relationship between political parties and non-incumbent candidates. The model predicts that legislators with a higher opportunity cost of government service will receive better committee assignments. Using data that spans 12 Congresses (97th to 108th), I find that when the opportunity cost of Senate service is measured by previous occupation, freshmen senators with a high opportunity cost for serving (those who were lawyers) were given good committee assignments, while freshmen senators with a low opportunity cost for serving (professors, and those with relatives already in politics) were given worse committee assignments.     

Ego identity formation in middle adolescence

Assumed determinants of ego identity were investigated in this study using sophomore, junior, and senior high school males and females. Subjects were administered the Marcia Ego Identity Status Scale and measures of sex-role identification, personality development, psychological functioning, self-concept, and parental socialization practices. Data analyses, using a median split on identity score, showed that high-identity adolescents obtained more positive scores on sex-role identification, personality development, psychological adjustment, and self-concept than low-identity adolescents. Socialization practices also differed for the two groups. The sex differences which emerged were congruent with the identity literature. Overall, the data supported Erikson's theory of ego identity development.This study was funded by Grant No. 791-01-010-502 from the Senate Research Committee, University of Nebraska at Omaha.Received his Ph.D. in developmental psychology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Major interests are in the area of social and personality development in children and adolescents.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, September 1975.     

Privatization,information and incentives

In this paper the choice between public and private provision of goods and services is considered. In practice, both modes of operation involve significant delegation of authority, and thus appear quite similar in some respects. The argument here is that the main difference between the two modes concerns the transactions costs faced by the government when attempting to intervene in the delegated production activities. Such intervention is generally less costly under public ownership than under private ownership. The greater ease of intervention under public ownership can have its advantages; but the fact that a promise not to intervene is more credible under private production can also have beneficial incentive effects. The fundamental privatization theorem (analogous to the fundamental theorem of welfare economics) is presented, providing conditions under which government production cannot improve upon private production. The restrictiveness of these conditions is evaluated.