The Poverty of Participation: Self-Interest, Student Loans, and Student Activism

Political scientists maintain that self-interest should motivate political participation; however, empirical verification of the self-interest motive for participating is rare. Self-interested activism among the less-affluent is shown to be even more uncommon. Results of the present study suggest that when lower-income college students have resources and increased self-interest motives to act, not only do they choose to participate, they do so at higher levels than their more affluent peers. Utilizing policy-motivated activism (defined as voting, contributing, and contacting officials) with respect to student loans, the analysis suggests that the probability of contacting increases among student borrowers as their income decreases. Results suggest that lower-income borrowers are more likely to participate out of concern for the program than their higher-income counterparts, and self-interest explains the behavior.     

Looking to the future: Prospective economic voting in 2008 Presidential Elections

Despite the economic turmoil of the time, a typical study of vote choice in the 2008 US Presidential Election would (falsely) find little evidence that voters’ opinions about the future state of the economy affected their vote choice. We argue that this misleading conclusion results from serious measurement error in the standard prospective economic evaluations survey question. Relying instead on a revised question, included for the first time in the 2008 American National Election Study, we find that most respondents condition their prospective economic evaluations on potential election outcomes, and that these evaluations are an important determinant of vote choice. A replication in a very different political context – the 2008 Ghanaian election – yields similar results.     

China–Africa Trade Patterns: causes and consequences

China's trade patterns with African countries have made Beijing the focal point of new anti-Chinese resistance narratives in Africa. Unlike the Maoist era, when China's trade policies served its leaders' political goals, now they aim to access markets as part of China's larger domestic development strategy. China's state-run firms can channel China–Africa trade through extra-market decisions that influence flows, yet, ultimately, Beijing's ability to direct trade with Africa is constrained by market forces. Despite suggestions that shared illiberalism drives China–Africa trade the author concludes that five interrelated causal factors overwhelmingly determine China–Africa trade: China's comparative advantage in labor-intensive and capital-intensive production; Africa's abundant natural resource endowments; China's rapid economic growth; China's emphasis on infrastructure building at home and in Africa; and the emergence of economies of scale in China's shipping and light manufacturing sectors.     

Trajectories Toward Peace: Mediator Sequencing Strategies in Intractable Communal Conflicts

The author identifies three distinct mediation sequencing strategies used in intractable communal conflicts: the gradualism model; a boulder-in-the-road approach; and the committee strategy. Using case examples of contemporary mediation efforts, he describes the three approaches and their advantages and disadvantages. A wider-angle approach to the differences in how mediators and conflicting parties achieve peace in these destructive conflicts is useful for both scholarly inquiry and practice.     

Modeling health insurance expansions: effects of alternate approaches.

Estimates of the costs and consequences of many types of public policy proposals play an important role in the development and adoption of particular policy programs. Estimates of the same, or similar, policies that employ different modeling approaches can yield widely divergent results. Such divergence often undermines effective policymaking. These problems are particularly prominent for health insurance expansion programs. Concern focuses on predictions of the numbers of individuals who will be insured and the costs of the proposals. Several different simulation-modeling approaches are used to predict these effects, making the predictions difficult to compare. This paper categorizes and describes the different approaches used; explains the conceptual and theoretical relationships between the methods; demonstrates empirically an example of the (quite restrictive) conditions under which all approaches can yield quantitatively identical predictions; and empirically demonstrates conditions under which the approaches diverge and the quantitative extent of that divergence. All modeling approaches implicitly make assumptions about functional form that impose restrictions on unobservable heterogeneity. Those assumptions can dramatically affect the quantitative predictions made.