Size,Power, and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants of Legislative Procedural Choice

I tested hypotheses about the relationship between exogenous institutions and legislative procedural choice using a unique cross‐sectional approach and a dataset gleaned from 55 legislative bodies from around the world. I focused on three entrenched characteristics of legislative bodies that we have theoretical reason to think will shape procedures: size, the relative power of the chamber, and the method by which its members are selected. Relatively small and powerful bodies generally have decentralized procedures. To a lesser extent, we can say the same of chambers that have electoral systems that incentivize the personal vote.     

COMPULSORY COMPETITIVE TENDERING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THE EXPERIENCES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND 1988-1992

This article examines the response of a sample of local authorities in the North of England to the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Cm) following the 1988 Local Government Act. It analyses the Organizational implications of CCT and highlights how officers, councillors and trade union representatives viewed the changing nature of management within local authorities in the period following the award of the first service contracts. In particular, it examines the different reactions to the development of a more commercial approach to the management of services and ends by assessing the specific impact of CCT in the context of other important changes in local government.     

Changing the Subject: The Case for ‘Social Politics’

Running through Bernard Crick's In Defence of Politics is an implicit faith in the ability of liberal democracy to deliver progress. From the perspective of 1962 such optimism seems well founded. After the years of post war austerity there had been more than a decade of steady growth, the middle class was expanding fast providing unprecedented levels of absolute social mobility (more benign and less complicated than the relative social mobility which today's politicians disingenuously claim to pursue). Matthew Taylor explores the case for ‘social politics’.     

'FATCATS' and Prosecution in a Regulatory Agency: A Footnote on the Social Construction of Risk1

This paper explores what, in the context of occupational health and safety regulation, the idea of risk means to legal actors whose task is to assess and act upon risks. It argues that while the occupational risk to the worker is important because it may prompt a regulatory response and it informs decisions about enforcement strategy, the decision-maker contemplating formal legal action will become preoccupied with the risks posed by the legal process to the successful prosecution of the case. The legal risks arise from the nature of regulatory work and the form and character of regulatory law. Legal decisionmakers respond to these risks in a systematic fashion preferring to prosecute cases which are quick, straightforward and unlikely to be defended. This leads to the selection of cases which are breaches of absolute (rather than general) duties and violations of provisions relating to safety rather than health, thereby skewing the application of enforcement.