The Worst of All Worlds? Electoral Reform and Britain's 2009 European Elections

At the 2009 European elections, Britain again elected its MEPs under the 'closed list' system of proportional representation (PR)—the third time it had done so since 1999. This article looks at claims that these elections vindicated PR by producing a 'fairer' relationship between the parties' share of votes and their share of seats, a truer reflection of diverse political allegiance in modern Britain, and (thanks to multi-member constituencies) a more efficient and sensitive system for representing voters. However, the article will also inspect the idea that the case for electoral reform was gravely weakened by the 2009 Euro elections. It will recall how PR again failed to boost turnout, again employed a method of counting that most voters did not understand, and again involved constituencies too large for meaningful representation. Furthermore, it will recall that PR allowed the election of two MEPs from the far-right British National Party. (With just 6% of votes, it is unlikely that the BNP would have secured seats under Britain's traditional electoral system.) The article will argue that, as a result, PR has had a centrifugal effect on the British party system and, potentially, a polarising effect on our political culture. Consequently, the article will assert that, owing to the success of the BNP in 2009, arguments about PR for Westminster have been 'ideologically neutralised'. The article will thus suggest that we can now take a more objective view of hung Parliaments and coalitions (the likely effects of PR at general elections), free from the assumption that they entrench centrist governments and progressive politics.     

The Strategic Use of Prisons in Partisan Gerrymandering

The census data used to redraw legislative districts counts the country's nearly 2 million prisoners in the location of their incarceration, rather than their previous place of residence. By drawing these phantom populations into districts that lean heavily toward the majority party, legislators can free up eligible voters from those districts to be distributed among neighboring marginal ones, thereby increasing that party's likelihood of winning additional seats in the state legislature. An analysis of state senate district finds that prison populations shift systematically from districts controlled by one party to districts controlled by the other following a switch in partisan control.     

MODELING THE EFFECTS OF RACIAL THREAT ON PUNITIVE AND RESTORATIVE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE PRACTICES*

It is clear that schools are mirroring the criminal justice system by becoming harsher toward student misbehavior despite decreases in delinquency. Moreover, Black students consistently are disciplined more frequently and more severely than others for the same behaviors, much in the same way that Black criminals are subjected to harsher criminal punishments than other offenders. Research has found that the racial composition of schools is partially responsible for harsher school discipline just as the racial composition of areas has been associated with punitive criminal justice measures. Yet, no research has explored comprehensively the dynamics involved in how racial threat and other factors influence discipline policies that ultimately punish Black students disproportionately. In this study (N = 294 public schools), structural equation models assess how school racial composition affects school disciplinary policies in light of other influences on discipline and gauge how other possible predictors of school disciplinary policies relate to racial composition of schools, to various school disciplinary policies, and to one another. Findings indicate that schools responding to student misbehavior with one type of discipline tend to use other types of responses as well and that many factors predict the type of disciplinary response used by schools. However, disadvantaged, urban schools with a greater Black, poor, and Hispanic student population are more likely to respond to misbehavior in a punitive manner and less likely to respond in a restorative manner.     

It's Not You,It's Me: Determinants of Voluntary Legislative Turnover in Canada

The Canadian federal parliament is unique among Westminster parliamentary democracies due to the unusually high level of voluntary and involuntary MP turnover that occurs at each general election. This article builds on existing research to test the hypothesis that the MP career duration is related to MPs' expectations about parliamentary roles, insofar as voluntary turnover is concerned. Data on MPs drawn from historical records collected by the Library of Parliament and from surveys conducted in 1993 and 2001 ¹ are used to develop an event history model which estimates the hazard of voluntary career termination when different parliamentary roles are taken into consideration. Findings suggest that a number of individual factors play a role in voluntary turnover, most notably that MPs who enter Parliament hoping to affect policy are the most likely to move on.     

The Extra-Parliamentary Tory Party: McKenzie Revisited

This chapter almost coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of Robert McKenzie's British Political Parties , a study which contested that power in the Tory party was centralised in its Parliamentary leadership, with its constituency members having only a marginal influence. The chapter revisits McKenzie's analysis in the light of developments since 2001, particularly the victory of Iain Duncan Smith in that year's 'democratised' Conservative leadership contest.
The chapter argues that Duncan Smith's victory strengthened McKenzie's claim that democratised parties are seldom popular, and describes how IDS, ironically, spawned reforms that diminished his extra-Parliamentary supporters. But the chapter is also an updated reminder that McKenzie underrated grass root power in certain areas - notably candidate selection - and suggests a lesson from the Tories' short-lived revival under Michael Howard, namely that long-term party recovery requires an energised party membership as well as a competent party leader.