MINISTERIAL ADVISERS,POLITICIZATION AND THE RETREAT FROM WESTMINSTER: THE CASE OF NEW ZEALAND

Political advisers are an established third element in a number of Westminster‐styled jurisdictions, as they are in New Zealand’s institution of executive government. In this paper we report the initial findings of a research project focusing on the role and accountabilities of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We locate these findings in the context of a growing body of international and comparative research on the role and accountabilities of non civil‐ or public‐service advisers within political executives and comment on the extent to which the findings affirm or refute the view that the ‘third element’ constitutes a threat to the continued application of Westminster principles and practices in New Zealand’s system of government – once described as more Westminster than Westminster. In doing so, we highlight deficiencies in standard conceptions of politicization and argue that there is a need to more clearly differentiate between its procedural and substantive dimensions.     

CLUMSY SOLUTIONS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD: THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Successful solutions to pressing social ills tend to consist of innovative combinations of a limited set of alternative ways of perceiving and resolving the issues. These contending policy perspectives justify, represent and stem from four different ways of organizing social relations: hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. Each of these perspectives: (1) distils certain elements of experience and wisdom that are missed by the others; (2) provides a clear expression of the way in which a significant portion of the populace feels we should live with one another and with nature; and (3) needs all of the others in order to be sustainable. ‘Clumsy solutions’– policies that creatively combine all opposing perspectives on what the problems are and how they should be resolved – are therefore called for. We illustrate these claims for the issue of global warming.     

Understanding Broadcast Political Talk

In June 1989, when Chinese citizens were massacred at Tiananmen Square, and in August 1991, when antireform Communists attempted to lead a coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the American public in unusually high numbers paid attention to the crises; the public s views on policy matters were recorded in public opinion surveys; press coverage of both crises was exhaustive; and elite opinion about U.S. policy was widely aired through the media, exposing the American public to the full spectrum of elite opinion. In both cases elite opinion (voiced in the media and measured through content analysis) was compared with public opinion (measured in public opinion surveys) to test the theories of Walter Lippmann and others that the elites lead public opinion about American foreign policy. In neither case could the dependence of mass opinion on elite opinion be demonstrated. The two bodies of opinion appear to have formed and been expressed in two different, nonoverlapping worlds.     

Legislative Intent in Law's Empire*

This article considers Dworkin's influential argument against legislative intent in chapter 9 of Law's Empire. The argument proves much less than is often assumed for it fails to address the possibility that the institution of the legislature may form and act on intentions. Indeed, analysis of Dworkin's argument lends support to that possibility. Dworkin aims to refute legislative intent in order to elucidate his own theory of statutory interpretation. That theory fails to explain plausibly legislative action. Dworkin's argument does not refute legislative intent but instead suggests there is reason to think that the legislature is capable of intentional action.