Environmental management and street-level regulators: A cultural trap?

It has been argued that environmental management is in an administrative trap. Numerous factors leading to this trapped situation have already been identified in the literature: institutional rigidity, lack of co-ordination, formalization, non-accountability and political interference. This study focusses on the organizational, cultural dimension of the administrative trap and argues that in order to reform administrative structures, the organizational culture must also be reformed. On the basis of several face-to-face interviews with street-level environmental regulators in Hong Kong, the study claims that a role-oriented, hierarchical culture exists. While such an organizational culture is in perfect agreement with existing administrative arrangements, it may, in the end, hamper the effectiveness of environmental management.     

Public opinion and presidential responsibility for the economy: Understanding personalization

The general mechanisms which underlie the psychological phenomenon ofpersonalizing (cognitive simplification and defensive attribution) would seem to have great utility in explaining attributions of presidential control over the economy. Yet previous research has generated inconsistent and inconclusive empirical results. This study identifies several sources of inconsistency and then attempts to clarify the approach by focusing separately on the object and the subject of personalizing. Our findings suggest that the determinants of personalizing to the president are different from the factors that explain personalizing to the incumbent. In addition, we find that the impact of the two psychological mechanisms differs substantially within economic subject areas.Paper prepared for delivery at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Fort Worth, Texas.     

Strategies of Resistance: Diversification and Diffusion

Why do organizations choose to use nonviolence? Why do they choose specific nonviolent tactics? Existing quantitative work centers on mass nonviolent campaign, but much of the nonviolence employed in contentious politics is smaller‐scale nonviolent direct action. In this article, we explore the determinants of nonviolence with new data at the organization level in self‐determination disputes from 1960 to 2005. We present a novel argument about the interdependence of tactical choices among nonviolent options in self‐determination movements. Given limitations on their capabilities, competition among organizations in a shared movement, and different resource requirements for nonviolent strategies, we show that organizations have incentives to diversify tactics rather than just copy other organizations. The empirical analysis reveals a rich picture of varied organizational resistance choices, and a complex web of interdependence among tactics.