Unpacking the Diaspora Channel in New Democracies: When Do Migrants Act Politically Back Home?

Migrant influence on politics back home has arguably become broader and deeper in the wake of a widespread convergence between out-migration and democratization. This article seeks to identify the structural conditions under which migrants from post-1980 democracies are likely to activate the “diaspora channel” of political influence back home. Specifically, I identify, explain, and code two sets of incentives likely to induce migrants to engage in home-country politics from abroad: (1) socioeconomic incentives generated by cross-border linkages and migrant characteristics likely to predispose them toward broader forms of transnational engagement and (2) political incentives generated by diaspora politicization and formal access to the political process in the home country. I score these incentives in 40 developing countries and then generate hypotheses about the degree to which migrants from these countries are likely to activate the diaspora channel through participation in home-country elections, lobbying for policy changes by the home-country government, or transnational coproduction.     

Do PCL-R scores from state or defense experts best predict future misconduct among civilly committed sex offenders?

In a recent study of sex offender civil commitment proceedings, Murrie et al. (Psychol Public Policy Law 15:19-53, 2009) found that state-retained experts consistently assigned higher PCL-R total scores than defense-retained experts for the same offenders (Cohen's d > .83). This finding raises an important question about the validity of these discrepant scores: Which type of score, state or defense evaluator, provides the most useful information about risk? We examined the ability of PCL-R total scores from state and defense evaluators to predict future misconduct among civilly committed sex offenders (N = 38). For comparison, we also examined predictive validity when two state experts evaluated the same offender (N = 32). Agreement between evaluators was low for cases with opposing experts (ICCA,1 = .43 to .52) and for cases with two state experts (ICCA,1 = .40). Nevertheless, scores from state and defense experts demonstrated similar levels of predictive validity (AUC values in the .70 range), although scores from different types of state evaluators (corrections-contracted vs. prosecution-retained) did not. The finding of mean differences between opposing evaluator scores, but similar levels of predictive validity, suggests that scores from opposing experts in SVP cases may need to be interpreted differently depending on who assigned them. Findings have important implications for understanding how rater disagreement may relate to predictive validity.     

Preventing repeat incidents of family violence: a randomized field test of a second responder program

This field test, conducted with the cooperation of the Redlands, California, Police Department, sought to vary one of the parameters thought to affect the impact of second response programs Victims who called the Redlands police with a domestic abuse complaint were randomly assigned (1) to receive a second response within 24 hours, (2) to receive a second response within seven days, or (3) to receive no second response. An examination of police records and surveys with victims six months after the initial complaint was called did not indicate any reduction in new abuse resulting from any second response condition. The current findings, coupled with earlier research results, strongly suggest that second response programs are at best ineffective in reducing the potential for new abuse and at worst may increase the likelihood of new abusive incidents.