Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game

A three-stage model isolates conditions under which an executive appointment to a collective choice body, such as a court or a regulatory agency, has an immediate bearing on policy. The model strikes a balance between previous formal models that predict either excessive gridlock or excessive policy responsiveness as a consequence of the politics of appointments. I test the model using approximately four decades of data on U.S. Supreme Court appointments. Two hypotheses summarize the unique predictions of the model and are strongly corroborated. A third, less distinctive hypothesis about strategic judicial retirements is weakly supported .     

Identification and isolation of male cells using fluorescence in situ hybridisation and laser microdissection, for use in the investigation of sexual assault

In cases of sexual assault involving an azoospermic assailant, vaginal swabs taken from the victim may fail to provide an autosomal DNA profile with which to search a suspect database, as the signal from any male cells present would be masked by that from the overwhelming number of female cells collected on the swab. Here, we describe a method of visually identifying diploid male cells in such samples using fluorescence in situ hybridisation, and selectively harvesting them by means of laser microdissection. This combination of techniques was tested on 26 post-coital vaginal swabs taken at a range of times after intercourse; the collected cells were then subjected to a simple lysis procedure and DNA was amplified using the AmpFlSTR^® SGMPlus^® multiplex under low copy number conditions. Useful DNA profiles were generated from samples taken up to 24 h after intercourse.     

Dogmatic Liberalism? T.R.S. Allan and the Common Law Constitution

Book reviewed in this article:
T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law     

Fairness in Bargaining

This paper uses historical and contemporary philosophical discussions of fairness to present a structural approach to the definition of fairness. After establishing a set of standards (not a specific definition), we assess the impact of fairness in negotiations and bargaining. Our analysis concludes that truly fair behavior is absent in bargaining and negotiations. Instead, behaviors that have been called just can also be characterized as self-interested. Our review suggests that the term fairness has been used rather loosely, as a convenient label or as a more palatable alternative to self-interested explanations for an individual's choices. For reasons of both parsimony and accuracy, we recommend that the self-interest of the actors be carefully considered before calling their bargaining behavior fair.     

Too Fine to be Good? Issues of Granularity,Uniformity and Error in Spatial Crime Analysis

Journal of Quantitative Criminology - Crime counts are sensitive to granularity choice. There is an increasing interest in analyzing crime at very fine granularities, such as street segments, with...     

Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World

Fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time. If left unattended, such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation. To better understand the mechanics of policy‐making in a changing world, we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation‐of‐powers system. We show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion—institutional features that, in isolation, elicit widespread criticism—can effectively ameliorate policies' susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change. The critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation, which increases all decision makers' well‐being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes. Although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation‐of‐ powers system, we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium. The presence of drift provides an opportunity for self‐interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency.