A Regulation of Bids for Dual Class Shares. Implication: Two Shares—One Price

This paper examines the consequences of a specific regulatory restriction on bids for dual class shares. Shares of different classes are often argued to have different prices because a premium will be paid to the superior voting shares in the case of a tender offer. This paper assumes a setup where regulations require that a tender offer pays the same relative premium to both classes of shares. In this setup, it is shown that both classes will sell at the same price as long as there is a strictly positive probability that either the current management is sufficiently strong or that a sufficiently strong rival will show up. Furthermore, under this weak condition the regulation is socially optimal in the sense that the management that provides the highest total firm value will be the management of the firm. Finally, the regulation is shown to favor (or protect) the holders of restricted voting shares and this is not necessarily at the expense of the holders of superior voting shares.The practical interest of this paper derives from the fact that some European countries have adopted different regulatory restrictions on bids for dual class shares. This has more or less occurred due to proposed EU Directives. The regulation examined in this paper applies to tender offers in Denmark. Empirical results on the voting premium in Denmark are shown to be consistent with the theoretical results in this paper.     

Operationalizing risk: The influence of measurement choice on the prevalence and correlates of prison violence among incarcerated murderers

A retrospective review was performed on the disciplinary records of 1,659 convicted murderers who had been admitted to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice between February 2001 and November 2003. Institutional violence was disaggregated by type of infraction, inmate or staff victim, extent of injury, and weapon usage to determine baseline prevalence and rates. Characteristics of the perpetrators, including younger age, more serious murder conviction, and longer sentence were associated with a higher incidence of prison assaults. Logistic regression analysis of a restricted sample of 1,440 male, non-death row inmates resulted in modestly predictive models for potentially violent acts (AUC = .668), assaults (AUC = .700), and assaults resulting in serious injury (AUC = .750). The findings suggest that the choice of measure used when operationalizating prison violence is crucial in determining baselines, but may have a more limited effect on identifying correlates and predicting outcomes.     

The BodeChecks solution: A high throughput analysis software combining GeneMapper ID, FSS-i, LIMS, and artificial intelligence

Combining key attributes of GeneMapper^® ID and FSS-i³ software packages with our internally created LIMS and some additional analytical programming has permitted us to increase quality checks on DNA profile data review while eliminating analysis time.     

From clients to citizens: Asset-based Community Development as a strategy for community-driven development

In this paper, Asset-based Community Development (ABCD) is presented as an alternative to needs-based approaches to development. Following an overview of the principles and practice of ABCD, four major elements of ABCD are examined in light of the current literature on relevant research and practice. This involves exploring the theory and practice of appreciative inquiry; the concept of social capital as an asset for community development; the theory of community economic development; and lessons learned from the links between participatory development, citizenship, and civil society. The paper outlines how ABCD both reflects and integrates trends in these areas, and stands to benefit from the insights generated from this work.     

BARGAINING OVER FIXED-TO-MOBILE TERMINATION RATES: COUNTERVAILING BUYER POWER AS A CONSTRAINT ON MONOPOLY POWER

The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to actas monopolists in pricing call termination on their networkshas recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G's entry into Europeanmobile markets. The European Commission's electronic communicationsregime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobiletermination rates if an operator is found to possess ‘significantmarket power’. This requires that the mobile operatornot be constrained by the ‘countervailing buyer power’of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailingbuyer power has been dismissed repeatedly because of their obligationto interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous.We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination ratesand demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligationis entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3Ghaving no market power at all in pricing call termination ontheir own networks.