Technology-transfer strategies of DOE's conservation programs

This paper examines the process by which R&D results funded by the Office of Conservation and Renewable Energy (CE) of the US Department of Energy (DOE) have generated commercial applications. It looks at examples of technology-transfer procedures and activitees across three of CE's component offices that correspond to the major energy end-use sectors: transportation, buildings, and industry. On the surface, the conservation programs would appear to have little strategic consistency and, therefore, lack the clear leadership many seek in a technology-transfer program. However, as an alternative to strategic consistency, one may tailor the technology-transfer approach of each program to its unique circumstances. This paper presents case studies of such tailoring, in which the diversity of approaches mirrors the complexity of the energy end-use markets and the private-public interests that must be negotiated to successfully commercialize energy-saving innovations. The paper discusses the lessons learned about the conditions requiring adaptive design and the structures and practices that have been proven effective.     

Transition from paper to paperless: DOD'S CALS system

When technology is transferred from one context to another, it is an established principle that innovation must take place. Even though a technology is well situated in one context, it must be adoptively redesigned for another. The sharper the difference in contexts, the greater the adaptation. This paper describes a program to transfer technology among a very diverse group of organizations: contractors to the US Department of Defense (DOD). Specifically, it describes how the technology of electronic communication, including electronic- data interchange (EDI), is being pursued by both the DOD and its supporters.     

R&D spinoffs: Serendipity vs. a managed process

This paper describes some of the spinoff benefits that can result from R&D projects, and categorizes them in terms of the dimensions of market and technical newness. These dimensions are discussed with reference to two types of spinoffs: 1) alternative market applications, when the results of an R&D project are subsequently applied to a market or use that differs from the originally intended application, and 2) second-generation technologies, when the technology that was the subject of an R&D project is significantly altered or enhanced in unanticipated ways through subsequent R&D. Examples from the Department of Energy's Energy-Related Inventions Program are integrated into the results of literature review to illustrate key concepts, including core technologies, degrees of market and technology newness, technology robustness, and the nature of connections linking spinoffs to prior R&D investments. The paper concludes by discussing spinoffs as a managerial strategy.     

The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension

Two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium (Koford, 1982). In a unidimensional setting, the outcome under the former is the median, while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location.This paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model, and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median, in particular for pure redistributive issues. However, for distributive issues, the two equilibria will differ. Finally, the comparative statics of the two models are examined; while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median, for distributive issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard economic comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences.     

State-sponsored violence as a tragedy of the commons: England's privateering wars with France and Spain, 1625–1630

The “tragedy of the commons” is the familiar problem that open access to a common property resource leads to overexploitation and to zero profits. A commons model is applied to an example of state sponsored private violence, the practice of privateering or licensed piracy. It is predicted that the presence of uncertainty about the value of the prey will reduce the amount of exploitation effort, and that industry profits may be positive due to both uncertainty and heterogeneous exploiters. Using data from England's wars with France and Spain between 1625 and 1630, the model suggests that the commons, represented by enemy merchant shipping, was not overexploited and that privateering profits were positive. The dynamic paths of privateering effort, ships seized, and individual firm profits were, however, consistent with the normal expectation that commons exploitation will peak and fall, as competition drives down returns through entry. “England was never richer than when at war with Spain.” Sir Edward Coke