The Strategic Uses of Gender in Household Negotiations: Women Workers on Mexico's Northern Border

The study illustrates the potential of the 'doing gender' perspective to explain why employment does not always improve women's household–power. Eighteen in–depth interviews with women maquiladora workers in Mexico suggest that, depending on the gendered meanings of household negotiations, employment may help women gain new rights and extend the limits of respect accorded them by male companions and parents. Nevertheless, women were more successful when they used negotiating strategies that conformed to their gender identity, such as making offers , than when they used negotiating strategies that challenged traditional gender norms, such as withdrawing services or making threats .     

Detection of cannabinoids in homicide victims and motor vehicle fatalities

A gas chromatographic/mass spectrometric (GC/MS) procedure is described for the detection and measurement of delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol, 11-hydroxy-delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol, and 11-nor-delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol-9-carboxylic acid in blood, or 11-nor-delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol-9-carboxylic acid in urine. About 50% of all homicide victims and motor vehicle drivers killed in Bexar County in 1985 were tested for the presence of cannabinoids. Of 130 homicides and 69 drivers tested, blood was analyzed primarily in all but 15 and 3 cases, respectively. In these latter cases, blood analyzed after urine was found to be positive. Of the homicide victims, 44 (34%), and of all drivers, 19 (28%), tested were positive for one or more of the cannabinoids. As a separate group, 16 motorcycle drivers tested had 38% positive as compared with 25% of the other vehicle drivers. Ethyl alcohol was present in 55% of the drivers, and in 63% of the homicide victims. Drugs other than alcohol or cannabinoids were found in 10% of the drivers, and in 12% of the homicide victims.     

International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War

Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.–ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works.     

Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability, and the league of nations, 1924-29

As foreign secretary from November 1924 to June 1929, Austen Chamberlain dominated British foreign policy. Central to his diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of the European balance of power and, in this circumstance, pursuit of a leadership role for Britain within the League of Nations. The foundation upon which Chamberlain based his European strategy lay with his determination to have Britain play the vital role of stabilizing relations between France and Germany, whose mutual antipathy after the Great War, compounded by the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, threatened continental security. By October 1925, his work bore fruit with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements. For the remainder of his tenure at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain used Locarno - and Germany's membership in the League that was part of that settlement - as the diplomatic mechanism to underwrite his strategic conception of the balance of power. This article addresses the neglected issue of the strategic base of Chamberlain's European policy and addresses three criticisms of his record as foreign secretary.