Issue competition in the 1993 Norwegian national election

Public Choice - We investigate the role of issues in the 1993 Norwegian election. We are interested in comparing two spatial models of issue evaluation, the directional model and the familiar...     

Fiscal Institutions,Credit Ratings,and Borrowing Costs

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal institutions on state government borrowing costs. We find that institutions have both a direct and indirect effect on interest costs paid by state governments. Revenue limits are associated directly with higher interest costs; expenditure limits, stricter balanced budget rules, and restrictions on state debt issuance are indirectly associated with lower interest costs because they lead to higher credit ratings. It appears that investors and bond raters incorporate information on fiscal institutions into their assessment of state government credit quality.     

Rereading the Public: Isolationism and Internationalism Revisited

This is the first installment in what we hope will be a recurring series of Forums in ISP. In each segment we intend to provide an outlet for peer-reviewed dialogue and debate on important topics in the field and to allow our readers to discuss material previously printed in the pages of ISP. Below are two comments on "Challenging U.S. Policymakers' Image of an Isolationist Public" by Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay published in ISP 1:1. Both comments raise a number of important issues pertaining to the relationship of public opinion and foreign policy, and also address more general questions of domestic impact on foreign policy outputs and several significant methodological questions about approaches to polling. The Forum begins first with comments by Richard Clark and Kenneth Dautrich, is followed by comments from Shoon Murray, and concludes with a response from Kull and Ramsay.     

Coerciveness and the selection of environmental policy instruments

Abstract: Degree of coerciveness is often used to categorize policy instruments. This article analyses the relative coerciveness associated with the instruments used by municipal, provincial and federal governments in Canada to address three major successive pollution threats ‐ sewage, industrial toxic waste, and greenhouse‐gas emissions ‐ that have appeared on the policy agenda over the course of the past century. During that time, there has been an overall trend of declining coerciveness, with one exception. In the case of toxic waste, established regulatory regimes were made more coercive some years after they were first put in place. These findings can best be explained by theories of instrument choice that look to interactions among relevant state and societal actors in the policy network. It is suggested that one aspect of that process in particular ‐ the balance of power between regulator and “regulatee” ‐is of importance in explaining relative coerciveness. We must first understand theability of the regulator to coerce before we can explain the selection of more or less coercive instruments. Sommaire: Le degré de coercition est un attribut souvent utilisé pour classer les politiques publiques. L'auteur de cet article analyse la coercition associée aux instruments politiques utilisés par les gouvemements fédéral, municipaux et provinciaux au Canada au cours du siècle demier. Les gouvernements en question tentent de s'attaquer à trois importantes menaces successives de pollution qui ont figuré au programme d'élaboration des politiques, à savoir les égouts, les déchets toxiques industriels et les émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Pendant cette période, les politiques coercitives connaissaient un déclin, exception faite des déchets toxiques où des règlements établis sont devenus plus coercitifs quelques années après leur mise en place. Les théories du choix des instruments politiques qui étudient les interactions entre les acteurs gouvernementaux et sociaux en matiére d'élaboration des politiques expliquent mieux les résultats relevés. On pense qu'un aspect particulier de ce processus, à savoir l'équilibre du pouvoir entre l'autorité de réglementation et les réglementés, est important pour expliquer la coercition relative. Nous devons dans un premier temps comprendre lacnpacité de l'autorité de réglementation à contraindre avant de pouvoir expliquer le choix d'instruments plus ou moins coercitifs.     

China's Future Economic Regionalization

This paper investigates China's economic growth potentials and limitation up to 2020 and recommends a trend of economic regionalization. A sustainable growing economy is a necessity for China's future stability. The growth sustainability of the Chinese economy depends essentially on its continued commitments to institutional reform and economic deregulation. China's relaxation of government intervention in economic activities has led and will be leading China to decentralize its central governmental authority over economic planning and control. This will consequently stimulate the emergence of regional economies in Mainland China. In the next two decades, there will likely be 10 regional economies with relatively independent industrial structures emerging in Greater China (or the Chinese Economic Area of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and the Mainland) as a result of economic liberalization and decentralization.     

Development of a Validity Scale for the Dissociative Experience Scale-Revised: Atypicality,Structure, and Inconsistency

Psychological Injury and Law - The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), the most commonly used scale for assessing dissociation across settings, lacks a validity scale. In this study, six methods...