Officer force versus suspect resistance: A gendered analysis of patrol officers in an urban police department

This study examined patrol officer use of force and exposure to resistance on a gendered basis in an urban police department. Using data from use of force reports for the year 2000, a weighted force factor value was calculated for each officer. These values were then compared by officer gender. The mean value for both females and males was positive, indicating a tendency to employ lower force levels in response to higher levels of resistance. The male officer weighted force factor value, however, was significantly larger than that for the females. Placed within the context of the use of force continuum, this result suggested that male officer use of force vis-à-vis subject resistance spanned a wider range. Alternatively, female officers could be viewed as operating within a narrower range of the force continuum. One interpretation of this finding was that female and male officers responded differentially to subject resistance levels.     

Improvisation and Teaching Negotiation: Developing Three Essential Skills

The notion of an adaptable negotiator, who can respond to any situation he or she encounters, resonates with every negotiation expert. Unexpected things happen in negotiation, and negotiators must be able to adapt in fleet and effective ways. Dealing with the unexpected, responding “in the moment,” and adapting effectively to sudden changes — these are the skills of an improvisational artist, and they are effective skills for negotiators to learn. How can improvisational skills be taught to negotiation students so that they will be able to draw upon these skills in the heat of a negotiation or mediation? By bringing together teachers of improvisation in various disciplines, we explored how improvisation is currently applied and taught in theater, business, and psychotherapy. We then developed some ideas about ways in which teachers of negotiation might begin to incorporate improvisation as part of the negotiation lesson plan.     

Interrogative suggestibility,self‐esteem,and the influence of negative life‐events

Purpose. Past research has frequently demonstrated the impact of life adversity on the behaviour and mindset of individuals. In terms of the formal police interview, the experience of negative life‐events may have an effect upon interviewee performance. This study, therefore, aims to investigate how negative life‐events may influence interviewee performance on the Gudjonsson suggestibility scale (GSS). Moreover, self‐esteem will also be investigated in relation to both the experience of negative life‐events and interrogative suggestibility. Method. Sixty participants were administered the GSS1. In between the immediate and delayed recall phases, interviewees were asked to complete the culture‐free self‐esteem inventory, the life‐events questionnaire and the Eysenck personality questionnaire. Results. Negative life‐events (NLEs) were significantly correlated with all of the GSS suggestibility scores (yield 1, yield 2, shift and total Suggestibility). Contrary to past research, however, self‐esteem scores were not significantly related to any of the GSS components or to NLE scores. Conclusion. This paper is the first to show a link between the experience of NLEs and GSS scores. The findings suggest that interviewees reporting a high number of NLEs are significantly more susceptible to the leading questions, as well as to negative feedback, administered during the GSS interview. Erroneous reports and false confessions may thus be more likely with such interviewees, potentially classifying them as vulnerable witnesses.     

Be Careful What You Wish For: Security Challenges Facing the Korean Peninsula During a Potential Unification Process

There is a lacuna in the literature analyzing the mid-term (6-24 months) period after a DPRK contingency that results in the Pyongyang regime’s relatively sudden and unmanaged fall. This article helps fill that gap, particularly with respect to security issues that would challenge Korean unification efforts during such a period. Following an Introduction, Section I first makes the case for a DPRK contingency being the most plausible end to the Pyongyang regime. Assuming the scenarios from Section I, Section II addresses the question of what critical issues a unifying Korea will face over the mid-term, and how dealing with these challenges will condition the type of end-state that a unified Korea will embody. In particular we examine three challenges: (a) mid-term security provision related to potential weapons proliferation, cyber-security, organized criminality, and human security; (b) the foundations of institution-building through measures dealing with issues of transitional justice, disputed land title claims, and generating broad domestic stakeholder buy-in in a unifying Korea; (c) the disposition of Korea’s strategic alignment in a Northeast Asia that will have undergone a major alteration of the regional system. Section III concludes with policy recommendations concerning what efforts should be made now to prepare for the situations described in Sections I and II.     

President Roh Moo-Hyun’s Last Interview and the Roh Moo-Hyun Phenomenon in South Korea

This commentary discusses what is popularly regarded as the “Roh Moo-hyun Phenomenon” in today’s South Korean society, as an attempt to shed some light on an interview which the late President Roh Moo-hyun had with the author in December 2008. This interview is unique not only because it became Roh’s last interview conducted before his suicide on May 23, 2009, but also because it provides Roh’s candid critical self-assessment on his own presidency, especially regarding his role in both domestic politics and the inter-Korean relationship, and the Korea-US relationship during his term in office, as well as commenting on Japan’s approach to Northeast Asian regional politics. Reflecting on Roh’s star-like rise to the presidency and fall from grace, this commentary alerts readers that Roh’s last interview needs to be considered within the context of the Roh Moo-Hyun Phenomenon, especially in regard to the 2017 presidential election, because it will directly affect the fate of not just the “pro-Roh group,” with the largest share of the opposition in today’s Korean society, but the Korean people as a whole at a time when the country’s many leading civic groups are desperately seeking a “Great Transformation.”     

Pseudo Change: China’s Strategic Calculations and Policy Toward North Korea after Pyongyang’s 4th Nuclear Test

After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem.