Welfare Implications of User Innovation

Innovation by users is now understood to be an important part of innovative activity in the economy. In this paper we explore the implications of adding innovation by users to existing models of social welfare that currently assume innovation by manufacturers only. We find this addition removes several inefficiencies, and that social welfare is likely to be increased by the presence of user innovation. Implications for policies that can impact users' freedom to innovate are discussed.     

Implementing Democratic Equality in Political Parties: Organisational Consequences in the Swedish and the German Pirate Parties

This article theorises and empirically assesses some important intra‐organisational implications of maximising democratic equality in political parties both between followers and members and between members and elites. They include weak member commitment, passivity of the rank‐and‐file membership and – depending on party structure – high levels of internal conflict. To substantiate the arguments, two parties that implement principles of democratic equality in their organisations are examined: the Swedish and German Pirate parties. These cases show, first, that while organisational structures implementing norms of equality allowed them to rapidly mobilise a considerable following, the same structures systematically reduced their capacity to consolidate support in the longer term – a weakness that might eventually put these parties' survival at risk. Second, they show that differences in the extent to which subnational units provide a foundation for member mobilisation helps to explain variation in the level of internal conflict experienced by these parties.     

Discretion and corruption: The Chilean judiciary

Corruption in the judiciary and its effects on the budget of that branch of government, the efficiency of justice (prompt or belated) and its quality (biased or impartial) are analyzed. The discretionary powers of the Supreme Court and those granted to judges to manage their courts, calendar and case load, and the hierarchical administrative structures of judiciaries, which function as a queueing system, may be used as a tool to maximize graft. These phenomena reveal links between institutional forms and incentives. Using the case of Chile and the exceptional emergence of corruption within the judiciary during the military dictatorship, the role of democracy as a punishing and preventive mechanism is highlighted.This article was written while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Orville Schell, Center for International Human Rights Law at Yale Law School, and under the auspices of the North-South Center of the University of Miami.     

Landnahme, das Wachstumsdilemma und die ?Achsen der Ungleichheit“

This contribution analyzes relations between capitalistLandnahme*, the current twofold??economic and ecological??crisis of capitalism and social inequality. The core assumption is that capitalist societies need to constantly seize non-capitalist social environments in order to safeguard processes of dynamic self-stabilization. At present however, a tipping point seems to have been reached as conventional economic growth, set to overcome economic crisis, inevitably increases ecological dangers. Advanced capitalist societies thus face a growth dilemma and it seems necessary to readjust the ??axes of inequality??. To this purpose a theory of capitalistLandnahme is essential, as this approach encapsulates an extended concept of exploitative relations, which allows for a pluralistic understanding of social antagonisms and relations of domination. This article offers a topical analysis of finance capitalism in order to exemplify this approach. It argues that theLandnahme theorem can be brought to bear fruitfully as an analytical link between a theory of capitalism and research in intersectionality.