Political Consensus and Fiscal Outcomes

It is becoming difficult to maintain consensus in a period of economic austerity, and this possibly challenges the ability of democratic institutions to take decisions on tough economic questions. In order to find out how political consensus influences fiscal outcomes, this article sets out to analyse the association between political consensus and public expenditure growth. The results show that political consensus is positively associated with both budgeted and actual expenditure growth, but also negatively associated with budget overruns. This indicates that political consensus comes at a cost, while at the same time politicians may be better at sticking to budgets if political consensus exists. The analysis is based on a pooled regression analysis of the local governments in Denmark in the years 2008 and 2009 using a data set combining survey data with administrative data on the local governments.     

Europe at the Fin de Siècle

In 1968 he was a prominent spokesman for noncommunist intellectuals, and he later became a founding member and leader of the human and civil rights movement “Charter 77.” The danger of totalitarianism has been his constant theme.     

Budgeting Rights: The Case of Jail Litigation

Judicial decisions are one element in the erosion of local government budgetary discretion. For example, litigation concerning constitutional rights forces local government officials to allocate resources toward the rights-based population. While rights-based allocation decisions may narrow the budgetary discretion of public officials, some managers may, paradoxically, be "better-off"—defined as the ability to protect and defend their budgets — when discretion is reduced. This thesis is tested through a case study of jail overcrowding litigation in a county government.     

An Empirical Assessment of the Municipal Financial Situation in Spain

ABSTRACT

Public finance theories state that both political and socioeconomic factors must be considered in order to explain governments' finances. On the one hand, “partisan politics matters” thesis argues that progressive parties contribute to increase public deficit. On the other hand, Roubini and Sachs' weak government hypothesis (1989a Roubini , N. and J. D. Sachs . 1989a . “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies.” European Economic Review 33 : 903 – 938 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 1989b Roubini , N. and J. D. Sachs . 1989b . “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries.” Economic Policy: A European Forum 8 : 99 – 132 .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) states that the higher the government fragmentation, the higher spending, deficit and debt. Accordingly, our work evaluates whether municipal ideology and political strength have an impact on public expenditures and taxes. With this aim, we analyze a representative sample of Spanish municipalities (2,729) for the year 2005. We find an influence of the size of the political majority on the municipal financial situation. However, we do not find evidence of the impact of the government's political ideology. Economic and population variables are found highly significant. Our data also show a “flypaper” effect in the Spanish municipal sector.     

Determining Factors of E-government Development: A Worldwide National Approach

ABSTRACT

The implementation of e-government aims at simplifying and improving the relationships and transactions between public administrations and their users or customers. In this vein, the objective of this work is to analyze the factors that promote the development of e-government in the national governments of 192 countries worldwide, differentiating between developed and developing countries. Our findings emphasize that the development of e-government requires that countries have a degree of economic development that enables their citizens to have a certain standard of living, both economic and cultural, as well as important internal government reforms which promote administrative effectiveness. Once these essential factors are fulfilled, the national government's online presence is favored by governments that rule with a majority in their parliaments and with an important fiscal capacity.     

Xenophobic Rhetoric and Its Political Effects on Immigrants and Their Co‐Ethnics

Though political scientists generally understand the origins of native‐born reactions to foreigners, less is known about how anti‐immigrant contexts trigger a political response within immigrant groups. I address this question by studying the connection between xenophobic rhetoric and Latino politics. I claim that xenophobic rhetoric raises the salience of ethnic identity and impugns its worth. This identity threat leads high‐identifying group members to engage in political efforts that assert their group's positive value, whereas low identifiers shun political opportunities to bolster their group's devaluation. I test these claims with an experiment embedded in a nationally representative opinion survey of Latino adults. In light of xenophobic rhetoric, I find that relative to low identifiers, high‐identifying Latinos become less politically trusting, more ethnocentric, and increasingly supportive of policies that emphasize ingroup pride. These results clarify xenophobic rhetoric's role in amplifying the influence of ethnic identity on immigrant politics.     

Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model

It is common wisdom that public sector wages are not determined in the same way as private sector wages. At the same time, the empirical evidence available for OECD countries finds a strong positive correlation between public and private sector wages. In this paper, we develop a model that is consistent with a political economy view of the determination of public sector wages and employment, while being consistent with the said empirical evidence. Public finance constraints are crucial: In booms, governments expand employment and wages, while in downturns, lack of tax revenues forces the government to cut back the wage bill.     

State Lotteries for Public Revenue

Lotteries, the state fiscal gimmick of the eighties, operate in jurisdictions encompassing substantially more than half the nation's population and enjoy considerable public acceptance. The revenue they generate is small, rarely more than two percent of state general revenue, it is subject to major year-to-year swings, and it is very expensive to generate, particularly when vendor commissions are recognized as part of cost. Furthermore, lotteries bear a high implicit excise tax rate and, because of the pattern of play across income classes, appears to worsen the overall equity of the revenue system. Their economic impact appears to be that of an internal transfer, although states with major lottery equipment suppliers have most to gain, particularly if they do not operate their own lottery. Lotteries are not destined to become mainstays of government finance, although their spread is likely, even with the fiscal questions they raise.