Blame shifting and blame obfuscation: The blame avoidance effects of delegation in the European Union

The delegation of governance tasks to third parties is generally assumed to help governments to avoid blame once policies become contested. International organizations, including the European Union (EU), are considered particularly opportune in this regard. The literature lacks assessments of the blame avoidance effects of delegation, let alone of the effects of different delegation designs. To address this gap in the literature, we study public blame attributions in the media coverage of two contested EU policies during the financial crisis and the migration crisis. We show that the blame avoidance effect of delegation depends on the delegation design: When agents are independent (dependent) of government control, we observe lower (higher) shares of public blame attributions targeting the government (blame shifting effect), and when agents are external (internal) to the government apparatus, overall public blame attributions for a contested policy will be less (more) frequent (blame obfuscation effect). Our findings yield important normative implications for how to maintain governments’ accountability once they have delegated governance tasks to third parties.     

An Enduring Partnership In Uncertain Times

The United States and India reaffirm their mutual commitment during Indian prime minister's recent U.S. trip u.S. President Barack Obama welcomed Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on November 24 with an em- phasis on the continuing value of a partnership carefully developed over the     

CRIME,ARRESTS, AND PRETRIAL JAIL INCARCERATION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DETERRENCE THESIS*

Using longitudinal data calibrated in daily intervals and a vector ARMA (VARMA) study design, we investigate the causal relations among the number of crimes reported to the police, the frequency of arrest, and the number of defendants held in pretrial jail confinement. Results show a lagged negative effect of frequency of arrest on reported crime. As the number of wrests made by police increases, the number of index crimes reported to authorities decreases substantially the following day. Additionally the analysis reveals a significant positive contemporaneous relationship between criminal activity and arrest levels. No feedback effects among the three variables are noted. In sum, our findings add empirical support to the thesis that the instantaneous and lagged relationship between crime and clearances are of opposite sign. That is, criminal activity increases arrest levels instantaneously, or at least relatively so, while the negative effect of arrest levels on crime levels transpires more gradually.