An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law

The international law of state responsibility determines whenstates are liable for international law violations. States aregenerally liable when they have control over the actions ofwrongdoers; thus, the actions of state officials can implicatestate responsibility whereas the acts of private citizens usuallydo not. We argue that the rules of state responsibility havean economic logic similar to that of vicarious liability indomestic law: the law in both cases provides third parties withincentives to control the behavior of wrongdoers whom they canmonitor and influence. We also discuss international legal remediesand individual liability under international criminal law.     

Procedural bias in forensic science examinations of human hair

Several forms of expert forensic science evaluations exist that rely at least in part on the subjective opinion of the examiner. Human hair identification is one such examination. This paper considers possible sources of influence or bias that may be responsible for examiner errors. Data are reported of an experiment that compares the conventional examination procedure (known versus questioned samples) against an alternative procedure (a lineup of samples) designed to limit the influence of factors that contribute to error. The altenative procedure produced fewer incorrect conclusions (3.8%) than the conventional procedure (30.4%).     

How do federal regulations affect consumer prices? An analysis of the regressive effects of regulation

This study is the first to measure the impact of federal regulations on consumer prices. By combining consumer expenditure and pricing data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, industry supply-chain data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and industry-specific regulation information from the Mercatus Center’s RegData database, we determine that regulations promote higher consumer prices, and that these price increases have a disproportionately negative effect on low-income households. Specifically, we find that the poorest households spend larger proportions of their incomes on heavily regulated goods and services prone to sharp price increases. While the literature explores other specific costs of regulation, noting that higher consumer prices are a probable consequence of heavy regulation, this study is the first to provide a thorough empirical analysis of that relationship across industries. Irrespective of the reasons for imposing new regulations, these results demonstrate that in the aggregate, the negative consequences are significant, especially for the most vulnerable households.