Underlying patterns in a current economic development model

Public officials may subjectively use a variety of elements, including economic characteristics and political considerations, in their selection of locations and allocation of resources for economic development. Policy capture is a method that determines the impartial weighting of a broad number of elements which influence these decision makers as they operationalize programs. Non-political criteria that may influence the selection of sites for local economic development provide the basis of the analysis conducted in this paper. Public officials at various levels of responsibility assessed the chances of creating jobs for disadvantaged residents (employment success) for a variety of hypothetical areas chosen as an enterprise zone. Their responses give insight into policy decisions. There is a comparison of both individual responses and groups of respondents to the hypothetical data as well as to actual zones that were recently selected. Concluding remarks will discuss these results and the application of this method for enterprise zones and other policy analyses.We wish to acknowledge the extensive helpful suggestions of the editor and two anonymous reviewers.     

Federal Constitutional Power Over the Economy

This article examines the non-fiscal powers of the federal Parliamentof Australia to make laws to control the economy. Although thecommerce power in Australia was inspired by that in the U.S.Constitution, the High Court of Australia has not followed theliberal interpretation of the commerce power adopted by theU.S. Supreme Court since 1937. However, other express federalpowers, particularly those relating to corporations and externalaffairs, have been used for purposes that in the United Stateswould be encompassed by the commerce power. While the AustralianParliament does not have the degree of power possessed by Congress,the judicial trend is toward broader interpretations of federalpowers. Also discussed is Section 92 of the Australian Constitution,which declares that "trade, commerce and intercourse among theStates shall be absolutely free." This provision, which limitsboth federal and state power, was interpreted for many decadesas embodying the principle oflaissezfaire. In 1988 the HighCourt of Australia held that its scope is limited to prohibitinglaws that discriminate against interstate commerce with a protectionistpurpose or effect.     

Explaining political sophistication

Debates over the political sophistication of mass publics smolder on. The more fundamental question, however, is why people become as politically sophisticated or unsophisticated as they do. This paper develops a nonlinear simultaneous equation model to weigh explanations of three general sorts: the politicalinformation to which people are exposed, theirability to assimilate and organize such information, and theirmotivation to do so. The estimates suggest that interest and intelligence, representing motivation and ability, have major effects, but that education and media exposure, the big informational variables, do not. I consider the reasons and sketch some implications for the sophistication of mass publics, for the study of sophistication and other variables of extent, and for democratic theory.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 9–11, 1987. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Douglas Arnold, John Bolland, Thad Brown, Carol Cassel, Philip Converse, George Kateb, Jan Kmenta, Kathleen Knight, James Kuklinski, Kenneth Langton, Melvin Manis, Diana Owen, Thomas Rochon, Marianne Stewart, Paul Sniderman, James Stimson, and Herbert Weisberg have provided feedback and encouragement. James Gibson relayed his results on the intelligence measures, even as they came off the printer. Mary Lee Luskin helped in many ways. If errors remain, they are mine.     

Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry

The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve fair competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of unfair foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference on Economics and Power organized by the FWS Institute of Zug and held at Interlaken, Switzerland in July 1988.     

Tollison costs and technological innovation: The case of environmental regulation

This paper departs from the Tullock cost paradigm that views competition for monopoly privilege as a welfare-inimical process that wastefully dissipates preexisting producers' surplus and, occasionally, leads to inefficient increases in costs and counterproductive uses of scarce resources. The potential availability of rent-seeking may bring about the elimination of inefficient regulatory regimes that retard or prevent the introduction of cost-reducing innovations. Air quality management is but one area in which innovation rent-seeking holds promise for concrete welfare gains. Researchers may wish to focus on institutional mechanisms designed to overcome the transactions costs and free rider disincentives to the formation of a coalition to seek innovation rents. An example of such a mechanism might be a joint venture that requires all venture members to engage in lobbying and to contribute to collective research efforts. These unaddressed questions await future research.The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of Gordon Tullock, Robert D. Tollison, Michael T. Marlow and J.R. Clark. The usual caveats apply. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the views of their employers.     

A. Review article the discovery of Morocco's northern coast

LE MAROC MÉDITERRANÉEN, LA TROISIÈME DIMENSION. Edited by HABIB EL MALKI. Casablanca, Editions le Fennec, 1992. 175 pp. Charts, tables. Dh48 (pb).

LE MAROC ET SON ESPACE MÉDITERRANÉEN. By FOUAD ZAIM. Rabat, Confluences, 1990. 216 pp. Maps, illustrations. Dh70 (pb).

REVUE MAROC‐EUROPE. Special edition ‘Le Maroc et la Mer’, no 2, 1992. Rabat, Editions La Porte, 1992. 332 pp. Dh80 (pb).

ON THE SPANISH MOROCCAN FRONTIER: A STUDY IN RITUAL POWER AND ETHNICITY. By HENK DRIESSEN. Oxford, Berg, 1992. x, 238 pp. 12 illustrations, 3 maps, 8 tables.     

B. Reviews and notes: bibliographies and works of reference

LE MONDE ARABE ET MUSULMAN AU MIROIR DE L'UNIVERSITE FRANÇAISE: REPERTOIRE DES THESES SOUTENUES DANS LES UNIVER‐SITES FRANÇAISES, EN SCIENCES DE L'HOMME ET DE LA SOCIETE, SUR LE MONDE ARABE ET MUSULMAN (1973–1987). By MARIE BURGAT, DANIELLE BRUCHET, JACQUELINE QUILET [& others]. Aix‐en‐Provençe, Institut de Recherche et d'Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman, 1989–92. 4 vols.

MAPAS, PLANOS Y FORTIFICACIONES HISPANICOS DE MARRUECOS (S.XVI‐XX)/CARTES, PLANS ET FORTIFICATIONS HISPANIQUES DU MAROC (XVIe‐XXe S.). By JUAN BTA. VILAR. 604pp. Text in Spanish. Table of Contents, Preface (by José Antonio Calderon Quijano), and Introduction in Spanish and French. Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Secretaría de Estado para la Cooperación Internacional y para Iberoamérica: Dirección General de Relaciones Culturales y Científicas, Agencia Española de Cooperación International, Institute de Cooperación con el Mundo Arabe, 1992. 7210 ptas.

A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AFGHANISTAN. By LUDWIG W. ADAMEC. Graz, Akademische Druck‐ u. Verlagsanstalt, 1987. vi, 252 pp. Photo section. ÖS 450.‐

TÜRKIYE DI?INDAK? TÜRKLER B?BL?YOGRAFYASI. A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF TURKS OUT OF TURKEY. By ?SMET B?NARK and others. Ankara, T.C. Ba?bakanlik Devlet Ar?ivleri Genel Müdürlü?ü Dokümentasyon Dairesi Ba?kanli?i (Yayin No.5), 1992. 2 vols. lxv, 1379 pp.

GULF CRISIS CHRONOLOGY: DAY‐TO‐DAY COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN THE GULF CONFLICT FROM 2 AUGUST 1990 TO THE 3 MARCH 1991 CEASEFIRE. Compiled by the BBC WORLD SERVICE. Harlow, Longman, 1991. 454 pp. £65.‐

FRAUENFRAGEN IM MODERNEN ORIENT: EINE ERGANZUNGSBIBLIO‐GRAPHIE. WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY. By INGEBORG OTTO & MARIANNE SCHMIDT‐DUMONT. (Biblio., 16.) Hamburg, Deutsches Übersee‐Institut, Übersee‐Dokumentation, Referat Vorderer Orient, 1989. xvi, 126 pp. DM19.‐

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 1993. London, Europa Publications, 1992. xxi, 988 pp. £130.     

Rogers v. Whitaker

The High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales' determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any material risk involved in a proposed treatment. A risk is considered material if a reasonable person in similar circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the doctor is, or should be, cognizant that the particular patient would express concern about the risk. The trial court overruled the precept that a doctor could not be found negligent in warning a patient if the doctor acted within the purview of common practice, even though other practitioners may follow different procedures and regardless of the particular patient's concerns. In this case, Maree Whitaker became essentially blind after an unsucessful operation on her right eye caused sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye. Although there was no question that the surgery had been performed with the requisite skill and care, Ms. Whitaker petitioned the court for relief due to the failure of the ophthalmologist, Dr. Christopher Rogers, to warn her of the possibility (approximately 1 in 14,000) that the sympathetic ophthalmia condition could develop. The trial court's award of damages was affirmed because, in spite of Ms. Whitaker's expressed specific concern that her "good eye" not be harmed, Dr. Rogers did not inform her of the potential risks associated with the surgery.