Third party decline in the UK: The SNP and SDP in comparative perspective

The failure of ‘third’ parties to displace their larger rivals is a consistent (although not universal) feature of competitive democracies which have simple majority electoral systems. It is argued that there are structural features intrinsic to most third parties which tend to accelerate the process of decline once it has set in. Because of their reliance on individual members, these parties put great stress on individual participation and provide the opportunities for it. As a result, they are particularly subject to the effects of internal competition which electoral decline is likely to intensify. The study tests this hypothesis by looking at two cases of third party decline, and concludes that the mass branch party format is ill‐able to cope with electoral failure.     

The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain,France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s

The theory of “preventive war” states that, under certain conditions, states respond to rising adversaries with military force in an attempt to forestall an adverse shift in the balance of power. British and French passivity in response to the rapid rise of Germany in the 1930s would appear to constitute one of the leading empirical anomalies in the theory, one the theory's proponents must explain. After clarifying the meaning of the preventive motivation for war and specifying the conditions under which it should be the strongest, we examine French and British behavior in the crises over the Rhineland in 1936 and Sudeten Czechoslovakia in 1938 through an intensive study of government documents and private papers. We argue that French political leaders, anticipating a continuing adverse shift in relative power, wanted to confront Hitler, but only with British support, which was not forthcoming. British leaders believed, even by 1936, that the balance of power had already shifted in Germany's favor, but that German ascendancy was only temporary and that British rearmament would redress the balance of power in a few years. We contrast our argument with alternative interpretations based on domestic political pressures and ideologically driven beliefs and interests.     

The Military as a Split Labor Market: The Case of Women and Religious Soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces

A conflict between religious male soldiers and secular female soldiers has emerged since the 2000s within the Israel Defense Forces. This clash has gradually taken the form of religious rhetoric, articulated by rabbis and other religious activists, that has moved from refraining from publicly questioning the fitness of women as combatants to discourse that gradually delegitimized women’s service. Based on the theoretical theme of the split labor market, I will argue that there is a link between the extent to which the growing introduction of women into field units threatens to devalue the religious youth’s symbolic rewards and the escalation in anti-feminist rhetoric, whose ultimate goal is to exclude women from the military.     

Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk

Gordon Tullock denied scientific status to economics because economists can trade results with the subject of our analysis. We suppose this trading to be the fate of all disciplines in which the results have consequences for well-being of those studied. Non-transparent trading in a statistical context gives no reason to believe that the sampling distribution of the estimates will be what it is believed to be. This false belief turns risk to uncertainty. Taking trading between experts and subjects as inevitable, we ask if the trade is fair. When scientific unanimity fails, can Rawlsian unanimity replace it?     

Militarizing peace: why did the Israeli military spearhead the Oslo Accords?

This article deals with the question of why the Israeli military played a major role in the design and implementation of the Oslo Accords in the years 1993–2000 even though this process was originally initiated as a diplomatic move. It is argued that the explanation lies in the army's role in politically mobilizing the anti-Oslo front comprised of religious and peripheral groups, most of whom had a nationalist agenda, as a strategy to counter their resistance to the Accords. The ‘people's army’, through which many of these groups attained social mobility and which they had traditionally trusted, was inherently the most effective mechanism for achieving this goal. This role was further intensified in light of the government's social policies that made these groups ‘peace losers’. Political recruitment took the form of the army's role in designing the Oslo arrangements as military ones.