A Fine Line Between Pleasure and Pain: Would Decriminalising BDSM Permit Nonconsensual Abuse?

The increasing social visibility of Bondage/Domination, Discipline/submission and Sadism/Masochism (BDSM) within Western society has placed pressure on the criminal law to account for why consensual BDSM activities continue to be criminalised where they involve the infliction of even minor injuries on participants. With moralistic and paternalistic justifications for criminalisation falling out of favour, one key justification that is gaining traction within international commentary on BDSM is the “bogus BDSM argument”. The bogus BDSM argument contends that BDSM activities should be criminalised because otherwise false claims of BDSM will be used by defendants to excuse or minimise their criminal liability for nonconsensual abuse. This article refutes this argument by showing how it relies on premises that are unjustifiable, illogical and irrelevant. This article concludes that the decriminalisation of BDSM would not permit nonconsensual abuse so long as legal officials were equipped with sufficient knowledge about the norms and conventions of BDSM culture.

     

Permanent representations to the European Union

Despite the burgeoning literature devoted to the European Union, there has been little scholarly attention devoted to the role of EU permanent representations and the degree to which they act as a linkage between member states and EU institutions. This article attempts to address this gap by focusing upon the structures, tasks and activities of permanent representations.     

Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence

We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states' behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members' practices, whereas others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior, the design of the institution, and variation in the organization and access of private interests that share the goals of the institution. We illustrate these propositions with examples drawn from international institutions for development assistance, protection of the ozone layer, and completion of the European Union's internal market. We find that significant externalities and appropriately designed institutions lead to convergence of state behavior, whereas divergence can result from the absence of these conditions and the presence of heterogeneity in domestic politics.