Political Environments and Implementation Failures: The Case of Superfund Enforcement*

The Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund enforcement program is examined to test the hypothesis that change in the political environment contributes to implementation failure. Agency achievements are evaluated under two enforcement strategies: a Burford strategy dominated by the Reagan administration deregulatory agenda and a Ruckelshaus/Thomas strategy that is more in keeping with the Agency's initial pro-regulatory legislative mandate. The latter strategy is found to be more effective in terms of quantitative and qualitative enforcement outcome measures. This supports the conclusion that the systematic intrusion of deregulatory politics into enforcement strategy formulation contributed to Superfund failure.     

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW

This article examines the relationship between persistent demands for "access to justice" and the relatively low yield of court-oriented social reform strategies. Access to justice has a symbolic attraction which is impossible to deny. Access may not insure justice or social reform, but it is an important political resource from which strategic bargaining advantages may flow. But the importance of the right to participate may be inversely related to its utilization. Beyond a certain level, expanded access may be costly. Its deterrent qualities may be diminished, and the legal system, when overloaded, may be unable to insure delivery of justice.     

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GANG AND NONGANG HOMICIDES*

Does gang-related homicide direr sufficiently from nongang homicide to warrant specialized law enforcement response? Both cross-tabular and discriminant analyses of data from over 700 homicide investigation files reveal substantial differences in ethnicity, age, number of participants, and relationship between participants. Gang homicides are also more likely to involve public areas, automobiles, firearms, and, in one jurisdiction, associated offenses and injury to other victims. Gang incidents present unique problems to investigators, who may well benefit from specialized skills of experienced gang experts.     

Leveson Past,Present and Future: The Politics of Press Regulation

As a result of the phone‐hacking scandal and evidence of other serious journalistic abuses by some newspapers, the government set up the Leveson Inquiry to hear evidence from victims and to make recommendations for a new and effective system of press regulation. Leveson's recommendations for independent self‐regulation overseen by a “recogniser” was seen as a moderate solution which would uphold the principle of an unfettered press while providing appropriate protection from unscrupulous or unethical press behaviour. After historic cross‐party agreement, Parliament passed a resolution accepting a Royal Charter which adopted the great majority of his recommendations. In response, Britain's main national newspapers have pursued a campaign of systematic misinformation and distortion, aimed at discrediting the inquiry, its supporters and the cross‐party Charter, while promoting a different system which would remain almost wholly controlled by the industry and would in practice be little different from the discredited Press Complaints Commission. After decades of ineffectual political response to press abuse and press power, there is now a historic opportunity for Parliament to assert its sovereign power. Over the next 12–18 months, we will see whether we have reached a genuine milestone in British public life or whether the British press will remain the last bastion of unaccountable power.     

INDUSTRY CULTURE AND INDUSTRY ECONOMY: CORRELATES OF TAX NONCOMPLIANCE IN SWEDEN*

Industry culture and industry economy have been used, with mixed results, to explain violations of law by corporate enterprise. The purpose of this paper is to use these theoretical concepts to examine differential noncompliance with tax law across Swedish industry in the early 1980s. A measure of noncompliance by industry is developed using tax audit data. The impact of audit policy on measured noncompliance is evaluated. Differences in industry culture are indicated by information on the presence and diffusion of techniques for noncompliance. Differences across industries in incentives to violate are indicated by bankruptcy rates and opportunities to gain through noncompliance. A hypothetical model is offered that explains the dynamic interaction of these factors and that could generate the static results reported. The paper concludes with a discussion of industry-level analysis in predicting corporate violations.