Dominant players and minimum size coalitions

Abstract. In this paper we present a result about Peleg's theory of coalition formation in dominated simple games (Peleg 1981). Further, a connection between Peleg's theory and Riker's minimum size theory (Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973) is established. This connection leads to a new theory of coalition formation in simple games.     

THE URGENCY OF LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN RWANDA

The challenges which lie ahead for post-genocide Rwanda's economic,social and political development are closely related throughthe issue of land. The pressure from a high rate of populationgrowth, added to the paucity of economic opportunities outsidethe agricultural sector, is forcing people off the land andinto poverty. Society is under extreme stress. Over the lastdecade the fabric of Rwandan society has been torn, resultingin ethnic and social divisions which culminpted in the eventsof 1994. Since then, new groups have entered the competitionfor land. Decisions concerning land and agrarian reform willunavoidably benefit some groups within this fragmented societywhile disadvantaging others. This article approaches the landproblem from two perspectives: first, by situating its socio-economicdimension in a deeper historical context and second, by consideringit as a specifically contemporary socio-political problem. Thearticle discusses the latest proposals for land and agrarianreform. While pressure on land has, over time, weakened socialbonds, it remains doubtful whether the government has the politicalstrength—in the present unstable national and regionalpolitical climate—to carry out the necessary reinforcementof communal bonds which economic development appears to require.     

Hair analysis for driving licence in cocaine and heroin users. An epidemiological study

Diagnosis of drug exposure is strongly supported by analysis of hair samples. In the province of Brescia, Italy, for regranting driving license to drug addicts or occasional abusers, a control programme was adopted including analysis of illicit drugs in two hair segments (0-3 and 3-6 cm) and in urine. From January 1998 to April 1999, upon request of the Local Medical Commission, 697 hair samples were tested in our laboratory. One hundred and eighty subjects resulted positive in hair for one or two of the controlled drug classes (73.3% for cocaine, 10% for opiates, 16.7% for both). Positive subjects were classified by residence, age, sex and license category. Seventy-two subjects were called back after 6-12 months and submitted to a second hair and urine analysis: in 34 cases the result of the first analysis was confirmed (19 negatives, 15 positives for one or both drug classes). Another 37 cases tested positive at the first control and negative at the second, suggesting the hypothesis that a strict control may have a significant deterrent function. The high percentage of negative results at the second control may be explained by the prevalence of cocaine users in the examined population. Our results allow us to conclude that the strict application of control rules lead to a decrease of social risk behaviours.     

Notes on the empirical analysis of cyclical processes

Abstract. This short note discusses a few general data-related problems which occur in analyses of cyclical processes, and offers a brief overview of the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches and techniques that can be employed. The conclusion is that one should be flexible in approach; it is always possible to model data in more than one way. A prudent strategy will always include the specification and testing of various models.     

CONSOLIDATING SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ARITHMETIC OF BUDGETARY REDISTRIBUTION

An absence of legitimacy of an economic dispensation cannotbe overcome by democratization alone. In unequal societies,new regimes also seek to increase economic legitimacy and thereforetheir own political legitimacy through redistribution. Socialspending is the most promising redistributive device availableto South Africa's new democracy to reduce racial inequalities,but there are constraints on increasing social spending or evenredistributing existing spending. To maximize political impact,spending will thus probably be concentrated on the most visibleprogrammes and concentrated in die cities. The impact on blackmaterial living standards of complete redistribution of socialspending is shown to be fairly large, but still may not satisfythe newly enfranchised. Coloureds, Indians and poorer whiteswould lose most from budgetary redistribution. As demands exceedresources, resource allocation then becomes a question of politicalarithmetic. This may assist in consolidating democracy amongsturban black ‘insiders’, but would effectively leavethe unorganized rural poor fiscally disenfranchised.