Reordering the French election calendar: Forecasting the consequences for 2002

Abstract. French politicians sometimes change election rules for political advantage. In the Spring of 2001, the ruling Socialists pushed through the inversion of the 2002 election calendar despite stiff opposition. What were the consequences of scheduling the presidential election before the legislature elections? Employing new techniques for French election forecasting, we show that the inversion brought great vote gains to the Socialist-led coalition in both the legislative and presidential arenas. One advantage of this forecasting methodology is that it allows counterfactual comparisons in advance of the actual election contest. Comparing the scenarios 'inversion' versus 'no inversion', the Socialist leadership appeared highly strategic and successful.     

Policy positions and jobs in the government

Abstract.  This article conducts a theoretical and empirical analysis of the allocation of the full set of jobs – both cabinet and junior ministers – in the Prodi Government that formed after the Italian election of 1996. We first discuss theoretical arguments linking forecasts of government policy to the policy positions of both cabinet and junior ministers. We then estimate the policy positions of cabinet and junior ministers appointed to the Prodi cabinet, applying a new technique for computerized content analysis to the collected legislative speeches of each minister during the 1996–1997 parliamentary session. Having considered the face validity of these results, we then use them to explore to observable implications of the various theoretical approaches. We conclude that, in this case, there does appear to be systematic evidence linking both the allocation of government jobs and the evolution of spending patterns between departments to the policy positions of senior politicians.     

Wasting a Crisis? Democracy and Markets in Britain after 2007

The banking crisis of 2007-2008 briefly threatened to overturn a system of market government that had lasted for nearly three decades—a system designed to minimise democratic control over markets. The crisis drew politicians once more into financial politics and exposed bankers and banking institutions to popular criticism and control. But the development of regulatory debates, and of the institutions designed to manage the crisis, have combined to avert this threat to the established order. The crisis is being 'wasted': it is failing to produce radical reforms. The paper establishes the intellectual and institutional origins of this failure, and argues that, while the reform window is closing, it is not yet fully shut: there exists yet scope for radical argument and popular mobilisation in the creation of a financial system with fewer pathological features.