The Social Scientist and Rehabilitative Crime Policy

Social scientists are in a quandary about crime policy. On the one hand, the tools of their discipline incline them naturally toward a search for the causes of differences in delinquent behavior, an inclination which appears to be supportive of the potential for rehabilitative components to crime policy. Both the premise of determinism and the methodology of differentiation are intellectually compatible with the prospects for rehabilitation, because both are requisites for a crime control strategy that seeks the impact of purposeful changes in the lives or attitudes of delinquents on subsequent behavior. On the other hand, social scientists are being confronted with a number of arguments that question the utility for social policy of adherence to these assumptions. The validity of some of these arguments is explored briefly in this article. They are found to suffer from an erroneous conception of the logic of determinism, an underdevelopment of the notion of deterrence, or an artifactual conception of the requisites for rehabilitation.     

Cooption and Power: Who Gets What From Formal Incorporation

This paper examines the central generalizable factors which influence the flow of power within formal or 'institutional' cooptive arrangements. It examines the key resources of four different types of societal group and explores the utility of these resources in the light of an account of basic government needs. In the light of this, it explores a range of group-government dependencies. Its aim is to set out why some groups can get more and others less from formal government cooption, other things being equal. This enables us to isolate factors of central importance to various cooptive arrangements in quite different contexts.     

Divided Government: America is Not "Exceptional"

America is thought to be an exceptional political system, and, in many of its particulars, it certainly differs from the institutional arrangements found in most of the world's democracies. Its separation-of-powers regime is thought to have spawned, in recent decades, the phenomenon of divided government in which partisan control of political institutions is divided between the major parties. By implication, it is suggested that this robust regularity in which Democrats control the legislature and Republicans the executive is a consequence of its institutional arrangements and, therefore, distinguishes America from its parliamentary counterparts elsewhere. In this article, the authors suggest that parliamentary regimes, too, experience divided government. Specifically, minority governments, in which the executive is controlled by parties that, between them, control less than a legislative majority, is the closest analogue to divided government in America. In each case, the executive needs to seek support in the legislature beyond its own partisan base. Thus, divided government per se does not distinguish parliamentary and separation-of-powers regimes. What does, however, are the constitutional roots of this phenomenon: divided governments are negotiated in parliamentary regimes whereas they are mandated electorally in separation-of-powers regimes.